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Article 1

ARTICLES

Crisis on the Immigration Bench
AN ETHICAL PERSPECTIVE
Michele Benedetto†
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Naing Tun walked into an immigration courtroom
seeking to remain in the United States, he expected to plead
his case before a neutral arbiter. Mr. Tun had painstakingly
compiled documents and gathered witnesses to prove his claim
for asylum. He had prepared himself to revisit difficult
memories of the torture and abuse he had suffered under
government officials in his home country, Burma.
Unfortunately for Mr. Tun, he appeared before an
overworked immigration judge who personified the failures
that exist in United States immigration courts. The
immigration judge made a series of conclusions regarding Mr.
Tun’s testimony later found to be erroneous by an appellate
court.1 The judge also improperly excluded evidence and
witness testimony submitted by Mr. Tun. Most alarmingly, the
judge disregarded evidence showing that the court-appointed
translator did not correctly translate Mr. Tun’s testimony. The
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judicial intern in a New York City immigration court. I am grateful to Professor
Anthony Thompson, Professor Philip Schrag, and Professor Andrew Perlman for their
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Neises. This article is dedicated to Maryellen and Jim Benedetto, and to the Honorable
Napoleon A. Jones, Jr., whose service on the federal bench exemplifies the best of
judicial ethics.
1
Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1027-29 (8th Cir. 2007).
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judge then relied on the erroneous translation to deny Mr.
Tun’s claim for asylum.2
Mr. Tun possessed the resources to appeal the decision
of the immigration judge. Without the intervention of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, who criticized the conduct of
the immigration judge, Mr. Tun would surely have been
returned to Burma to face further persecution.3
Najah Georges Elias faced a similarly challenging
experience in immigration court. Seeking to avoid removal to
Iraq, where he believed he would be persecuted for his religion,
Mr. Elias requested asylum in the United States. During his
hearing, the immigration judge addressed Mr. Elias in a
manner later described by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
as “argumentative, sarcastic, and sometimes arguably
insulting.”4 The court noted the immigration judge appeared to
“badger” Mr. Elias at times during the hearing, “likely making
[Mr. Elias] more nervous and affecting his testimony.”5 As a
result of the immigration judge’s hostility and bias toward Mr.
Elias, the court vacated Mr. Elias’s removal order and
remanded his case for consideration before a different
immigration judge.6 As the court stated, “[Mr. Elias] was
entitled to a fair hearing, but did not receive one.”7
Mr. Tun’s and Mr. Elias’s experiences represent a
widespread problem. Legal scholars, appellate judges,
practitioners, and even the former United States Attorney
General have expressed growing concern regarding the status
of the immigration court system.8 As Judge Richard Posner
noted in 2005, the adjudication of cases by immigration judges
has “fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice.”9
Later that year, the New York Times reported that federal

2

Id. at 1030.
Id.
4
Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 451 (6th Cir. 2007).
5
Id. at 452.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 452-53.
8
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize Judges’ Handling of Asylum Cases,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at A1; Sydenham B. Alexander III, A Political Response
to Crisis in the Immigration Courts, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2006); Benslimane v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005); Memorandum to Immigration Judges
from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf.
9
Benslimane, 430 F.3d at 830.
3
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appeals courts “repeatedly excoriated” immigration judges for a
“pattern of biased and incoherent decisions.”10
Scholars have accurately termed the situation a “crisis”
and are calling for major structural reforms.11 For example, in
the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal in Fall 2006,
Sydenham B. Alexander III outlined evidence showing that
immigration courts are failing to properly apply the law.12 Mr.
Alexander proposed a political solution to the problem,
suggesting the creation of a political campaign designed to
“force needed changes to the immigration court system.”13 More
recently, in a Stanford Law Review article, Professors Jaya
Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz, and Philip G. Schrag
analyzed data from asylum offices, immigration courts, the
Board of Immigration Appeals, and the United States Courts of
Appeal showing remarkable inconsistencies in grant rates for
asylum decisions among immigration courts, and even among
judges in the same courthouse.14 Professors Ramji-Nogales,
Schoenholtz, and Schrag were “troubled” by the ramifications
of their findings, which indicated an asylum applicant’s case is
“seriously influenced by a spin of the wheel” assigning his case
to a particular judge.15
Additional evidence of the problem can be found in cases
reviewed by the circuit courts.16 Many immigration judges
appear to be determining cases in a haphazard manner, with
decisions influenced more by personal preferences than by
careful consideration of facts and law.17 As a result, litigants in
immigration court can no longer be assured of ethical and
10

Liptak, supra note 8.
Alexander, supra note 8, at 11; see also Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2007); Eliot
Walker, Asylees in Wonderland: A New Procedural Perspective on America’s Asylum
System, 2 NW J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 1 (2007) (“That the American asylum system has
fallen into disrepute is no longer a significantly contested point of debate.”); Evelyn H.
Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the Harm: The Impact of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’s Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 481, 507 (2005).
12
Alexander, supra note 8, at 11-36.
13
Id. at 45.
14
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 296, 332.
15
Id. at 378.
16
See infra Part III.E; see also cases cited infra note 149.
17
See, e.g., Sun v. Bd. of Immigration Appeals, No. 05-4447, 2007 WL
2705601 at *3 (2d. Cir. Sept. 14, 2007) (removing an immigration judge from a case
because her comments to the asylum applicant and her conduct during the hearing
created “substantial uncertainty as to whether the record below was fairly and reliably
developed”); see also Nina Bernstein, Judge Who Chastised Weeping Asylum Seeker Is
Taken Off Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2007, at B1.
11
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accurate decision-making when they present their case to an
immigration judge. Scholars and reform advocates have
extensively considered the causes of this problem and the
resulting surge of appeals to the circuit courts: contributing
factors include recent structural changes to the immigration
court system, lack of resources for immigration judges, and
pressure on judges to decide cases expeditiously.18 When an
element of the American judicial system is consistently
adjudicating cases using biased or legally incorrect reasoning,
the result is indeed a “crisis.”
The purpose of this article is to suggest a new lens
through which to examine the crisis in immigration courts:
judicial ethics. Ethical considerations frequently play a decisive
role in the resolution of immigration cases, in part because the
outcomes for litigants in immigration courts can depend almost
entirely on the attitude of the judge. Accordingly, the
acknowledged crisis in immigration courts has severe
implications for judicial ethics. Because the term “judicial
ethics” encompasses a broad array of principles, this article will
narrow its focus to bias and incompetence on the part of
immigration judges in the courtroom.
Part II considers the unique structure of the
immigration court, focusing on the current disciplinary
procedures for immigration judges and Attorney General John
Ashcroft’s “streamlining” reforms of 2003. Part III then
discusses the existence of an ethical crisis through statistics
showing inconsistent decisions and cases reviewed by circuit
courts illustrating judicial bias and incompetence. Part IV next
examines causes of such conduct and pending solutions to the
problem. Part IV pays special attention to the Attorney
General’s proposed “Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges
and BIA Members.” While some would argue the mere
existence of this suggested standard of conduct is promising,
Part IV explains that the new Codes of Conduct lack both
specificity and enforceability.
18
The causes of the “surge” in appeals to the circuit courts have been much
examined by legal scholars. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8, at 9-10; John R.B.
Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of
Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 13, 14-15 (2006-2007); Martin
S. Krezalek, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process Rights While
Preserving the BIA’s Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO IMMIGR. L.J. 277, 289
(2007); Gerald Seipp & Sophie Feal, Overwhelmed Circuit Courts Lashing Out at the
BIA and Selected Immigration Judges: Is Streamlining to Blame?, 82 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 2005, 2005-07 (Dec. 19, 2005).
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This article not only analyzes the existing crisis with an
eye toward the ethical implications of the challenges facing
immigration courts, but also offers proposals designed to
encourage unbiased and competent behavior on the
immigration bench. Accordingly, Part V recommends practical
reforms in response to the ethical nature of this crisis.
Implementation of these reforms will initiate the process of
restoring the ethical integrity of the immigration bench.
II.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE IMMIGRATION COURT SYSTEM

A.

The Players: Members of the Executive Branch

Immigration judges and their courtrooms do not operate
as members of the Judicial Branch of government. Because
immigration issues often involve “especially sensitive political
functions that implicate questions of foreign relations,”19 courts
recognize that the decisions permitting or preventing foreign
nationals from immigrating are “frequently of a character more
appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive [Branch]
than to the Judiciary.”20
Hence, the Executive Branch is responsible for the
establishment of policy and procedures relating to immigration
proceedings. This responsibility has been entrusted to the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) since 1940 and is delegated to
the Attorney General.21 Currently, immigration judges are
members of the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of
Immigration Review (“EOIR”), an agency within the DOJ
created in 1983.22
Under authority delegated by the Attorney General,
EOIR “interprets and administers” immigration law by
“conducting immigration court proceedings, appellate reviews,
19
INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988); see also Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (noting that it is a sovereign power of government to
“exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interests
require such exclusion”).
20
Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); see also Robert M. Cannon, A
Reevaluation of the Relationship of the Administrative Procedure Act to Asylum
Hearings: The Ramifications of the American Baptist Churches’ Settlement, 5 ADMIN.
L.J. 713, 716 (1991).
21
See Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853 § 327, 54 Stat. 1137, 115051 (1940); see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 8 n.45.
22
Executive Office of Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Missions
and Functions Statement [hereinafter DOJ Mission Statement], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/mps/manual/eoir.htm#content (signed by John Ashcroft Nov.
19, 2004).
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and administrative hearings.”23 EOIR includes the Office of the
Director, the Board of Immigration Appeals, the Office of the
Chief Immigration Judge (“OCIJ”), and the Office of the Chief
Administrative Hearing Officer.24
The OCIJ manages the fifty-three immigration courts
located around the country.25 Immigration judges (“IJs”)
adjudicate individual immigration cases and their decisions are
usually unpublished oral decisions recorded on tapes.26 The
Attorney General sets the qualifications and terms of office for
IJs, who are paid salaries of $109,720 to $149,200.27 The
majority of judges appointed to the immigration bench in the
initial years of EOIR’s existence fit the same profile: white,
male judges in their forties, fifties, or early sixties, who nearly
all formerly worked for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (“INS”) prosecuting immigration cases.28
B.

The Appointment Process

The appointment process for immigration judges differs
widely from the process for federal, state, and administrative
law judges. Federal judges are nominated by the President and
appointed with the advice and consent of the Senate.29 In
addition to public confirmation hearings before members of the
Senate, federal judicial nominees undergo investigations by the
FBI, Department of Justice, and the American Bar Association
(“ABA”).30 Theoretically, this type of vetting process helps to
ensure that only “ethical” persons become Article III judges,
thus minimizing the occurrence of unethical behavior on the
federal bench.31
23

Id.
Id.
25
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-771, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR
IMMIGRATION REVIEW CASELOAD PERFORMANCE REPORTING NEEDS IMPROVEMENT
(2006) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d06771.pdf.
26
Alexander, supra note 8, at 9.
27
Id.
28
Telephone Interview with anonymous former IJ, July 25, 2007 [hereinafter
Former IJ Interview]. The current immigration bench is more diverse. Id.
29
Fair and Independent Courts: A Conference on the State of the Judiciary,
Appendix I: Tiers of Federal Judges—Article III and Statutory Federal Judges, Their
Numbers, Selection, and Tenure, 95 GEO L.J. 1009, 1015 (2007).
30
THOMAS E. BAKER, THE GOOD JUDGE: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL JUDICIAL RESPONSIBILITY 52 (1989).
31
Id. (“[T]he appointment process performs double duty as a mechanism for
keeping the already corrupt, infirm, or unable person off the bench and as a screen to
24
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State judges can be either appointed or elected,
depending on the process prescribed by the individual state.32
State judges generally do not undergo confirmation hearings,
but appointed judges can be subject to approval by designated
commissions.33
The selection of administrative law judges (“ALJs”) to
work in federal agencies is entrusted to the U.S. Office of
Personnel Management. Candidates for ALJ positions must
meet licensing and experience requirements, and must pass a
competitive administrative law judge examination to qualify
for an ALJ position.34 To be considered, an applicant must be a
licensed attorney with seven years of litigation or
administrative trial experience.
In contrast, immigration judges are appointed by the
Attorney General and act under his control and supervision.35
Immigration judges traditionally are individuals with
immigration law expertise, who are chosen through a
competitive civil service process.36 Those applying for the
positions are vetted by EOIR, and EOIR’s recommendations
are forwarded to the Office of the Deputy Attorney General,
where they are usually approved.37 Contrary to the procedure
for federal judges, the appointment process for immigration
judges is not subject to a broad system of checks and balances;
rather, the Executive Branch alone is responsible for the
appointment of immigration judges. Unlike administrative law
judges, immigration judges historically have not been required
to pass a competitive exam to be appointed to the bench.38
select judges who are, at once, independent and committed to the separation of powers
and federalism.”).
32
California state judges, for example, can be appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the commission on judicial appointments, or can be elected through a
nonpartisan election. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, CALIFORNIA: CURRENT
METHODS OF JUDICIAL SELECTION, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/CA_methods.htm
(last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
33
See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, SUMMARY OF INITIAL ELECTION
METHODS, available at http://www.ajs.org/js/SummaryInitialSelection.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2008).
34
U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, QUALIFICATION STANDARD
FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE POSITIONS, available at http://www.opm.gov/
qualifications/alj/alj.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2007).
35
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4) (2006); see also GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 n.2.
36
See GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 1 n.6.
37
Emma Schwartz & Jason McLure, DOJ Made Immigration Judgeships
Political, LEGAL TIMES, May 28, 2007.
38
Attorney General Gonzales recently directed the EOIR Director to
“[a]dminister an examination for newly-appointed immigration judges . . . with respect
to their familiarity with key principles of immigration law before they begin to
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The appointment process for IJs changed under the
leadership of Attorney General John Ashcroft and has been
criticized in recent months for lacking public visibility.39 The
lack of transparency in the process is an especially important
issue in light of recent revelations that the Bush
administration has consistently appointed individuals with
little or no immigration experience to the immigration bench.40
There are allegations that Attorney General Ashcroft and his
successor, Alberto Gonzales, politicized the appointment
process and promoted the hiring of unqualified individuals,
even though the DOJ explicitly requires seven years of relevant
legal experience.41 While testifying before Congress for the
Department of Justice, former aide to the Attorney General
Monica Goodling acknowledged that she “evaluated candidates
based on her perception of their political loyalties” and “asked
inappropriate questions of many applicants for career jobs at
the department,” including immigration judge positions.42
One veteran immigration attorney, who was passed over
for two judgeships in favor of political friends of the Bush
administration, has even sued the DOJ for discrimination.43
Responding to the lawsuit, the DOJ stated that “all but four
immigration judges chosen . . . from late 2003 to 2006[] were
hired without public competition.”44 Half of the judges chosen
since 2004 did not have any immigration experience.45
In a recently publicized example, a newly appointed
immigration judge in Lancaster, California, had minimal
adjudicate matters . . . .” Authorities Delegated to the Director of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge [hereinafter Authorities
Delegated to the Director], 72 Fed. Reg. 53,673, 53,677 (Sept. 20, 2007) (codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 1003.0(b)(1)(vi) (2007)).
39
See, e.g., Schwartz & McLure, supra note 37.
40
Id.
41
See Scott Horton, Meltdown at DOJ: The Story of the Immigration Judge
Scam, HARPER’S, May 30, 2007, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2007/
05/hbc-90000186; see also Dan Eggen, Officials Say Justice Dept. Based Hires
on Politics Before Goodling Tenure, WASH. POST, May 26, 2007, at A2; David Johnston
& Eric Lipton, Bush Reaffirms His Support for Gonzales, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007,
at A17.
42
Schwartz & McLure, supra note 37, at *2. Retired IJ Bruce Einhorn, noting
the shift to politically motivated appointments, stated that “A lot of my colleagues in
[the immigration] bar seemed to have applications pending for years without ever
being interviewed while people with contacts at the White House were being appointed
at warp speed.” Id. at *30.
43
Id. at *50
44
Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Immigration Judges Often Picked Based on
GOP Ties, WASH. POST, June 11, 2007, at A1.
45
Id.
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immigration experience when he was appointed to the
immigration bench; in the nine years prior to his appointment,
Judge Ted White had worked as a public defender and as an
administrative law judge.46 Judge White resigned shortly before
his one-year probation period was completed but not before
attorneys recognized that “he didn’t really understand the
law. . . . He often seemed to rely on trial attorneys [i.e.,
government prosecutors] for guidance.”47 In addition to raising
serious questions about judicial competence, Judge White’s
appointment highlighted the need for a more visible selection
process for immigration judges.
Judges and immigration experts have sharply criticized
the DOJ for these appointment practices. For example, a
deputy director from the American Immigration Lawyers
Association (“AILA”) voiced concern that “when we start seeing
people who look like [they’re fulfilling] someone’s political debt
get these positions, it starts to become disturbing.”48
In response to such criticism, the Attorney General
changed the appointment process. In April 2007, the DOJ
implemented a new hiring program requiring “public
announcements of open positions and detailed evaluations and
interviews, with a final decision still in the hands of the
Attorney General.”49 An open appointment process will
hopefully bring more experienced candidates to these positions,
and will increase the transparency of the selection process.
C.

Immigration Proceedings

A fair appointment process for immigration judges is
particularly important because an IJ often makes the ultimate
determination of an immigrant’s fate. An individual seeking
relief from deportation usually enters the murky world of
immigration law with a “removal proceeding” initiated by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). If a foreign
national is found to be removable, he may be eligible to apply
46
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration Judge Takes Oath in
Lancaster (Sept. 28, 2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/06/White.pdf.
47
Sandra Hernandez, Immigration Judge’s Sudden Resignation Raises
Eyebrows, L.A. DAILY J., July 10, 2007, available at www.bibdaily.com/index.cgi (enter
keyword “pistol” and search in titles for Pistol-Packin’ IJ Abruptly Quits). It was
revealed after his resignation that Judge White kept handguns and ammunition in his
judicial chambers, conduct that is prohibited by the DOJ. Id.
48
Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44.
49
Id.
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for various forms of discretionary relief, including voluntary
departure, cancellation of removal, and asylum.50 To avoid
deportation through discretionary relief, an immigrant must
prove that he is eligible for such relief under the law and that
he “deserves such relief as an exercise in discretion.”51
Proceedings usually result in an evidentiary hearing
held before an immigration judge, in which the IJ has
discretion to determine whether the applicant is eligible to
remain in the United States.52 This hearing is critical for the
applicant seeking to avoid deportation. For many persons, the
immigration court hearing represents their only chance to
present evidence supporting their case.53
Decisions made by immigration judges are not subject to
the ordinary procedures of judicial review.54 If either the foreign
national or the United States disagrees with the immigration
judge’s determination, they may petition for review with the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). The BIA serves as the
second level of adjudicators within the Department of Justice,
and issues unpublished but written decisions.55 In 2002,
Attorney General John Ashcroft restructured the BIA, which
now has eleven members hearing appeals from decisions
handed down by immigration judges.56
BIA decisions may be further appealed to the U.S.
Courts of Appeal. In theory, the Supreme Court could accept a
petition for certiorari from an immigrant ordered to be
removed. In practice, however, the Supreme Court has only
accepted such review in a “handful” of cases.57 Judicial
impartiality and fair proceedings are therefore especially
important, particularly for immigrants facing persecution in
their home countries. A loss in immigration court resulting in
50
For a description of these forms of discretionary relief, see Executive
Office for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet: Forms of Relief from
Removal
(Aug.
3, 2004),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/press/04/
ReliefFromRemoval.htm.
51
Id.
52
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 369, 371-2 (2006); Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 308-09.
53
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 326.
54
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 101 n.21 (1976) (“[T]he power
over aliens is of a political character and therefore subject only to narrow judicial
review.”).
55
Alexander, supra note 8, at 9.
56
DOJ Mission Statement, supra note 22. For a more detailed discussion of
Ashcroft’s reforms, see infra Part II.E.
57
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 310.
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removal could be a “death sentence for some asylum seekers
whose cases are wrongly denied.”58
D.

Ashcroft’s Reforms: The Streamlining Regulations

In the late 1990s, the BIA’s delayed response in
reviewing removal orders created concern that foreign
nationals were filing appeals merely to remain longer in the
United States.59 In 2002 and 2003, Attorney General John
Ashcroft implemented a series of reforms in an attempt to
reduce the delays and the backlog of cases in the BIA.60
One of Ashcroft’s reform measures altered the
procedures of the BIA appellate process. The standard BIA
process had operated in a style much like the federal appellate
courts; BIA members decided cases as three-member panels
and issued reasoned written opinions.61 Ashcroft’s streamlined
regulations eliminated the BIA’s three-member panels except
in a few categories of cases.62 Additionally, the BIA was ordered
to cease writing opinions and instead issue a single-member
affirmance without opinion if the IJ’s decision should be
upheld.63
As he proclaimed the importance of decreasing the BIA
backlog, Ashcroft’s reforms went one step further. He
decreased the number of positions on the BIA from twentythree to eleven.64 Although Ashcroft refused to explain what
criteria he would use to determine which members would be
removed, he was later criticized for selecting those BIA
members most likely to rule in favor of foreign nationals for
removal.65 In fact, “liberal board members appear to have been
58

Id. at 327.
Alexander, supra note 8, at 11-12.
60
Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case
Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 3)
[hereinafter Procedural Reforms].
61
Legomsky, supra note 52, at 375.
62
Procedural Reforms, supra note 60, at 54,880; see also Legomsky supra
note 52, at 375.
63
Procedural Reforms, supra note 60, at 54,885-86, see also Legomsky supra
note 52, at 375.
64
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 352.
65
Legomsky, supra note 52, at 376. According to one board member who left
shortly before the changes occurred, “It was a purge. They brought in people who have
all worked from one side of the issue, the government perspective.” David Adams,
Courts Overwhelmed by Immigration Cases, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, May 25, 2006,
available at http://www.sptimes.com/2006/05/29/Worldandnation/Courts_overwhelmed_
by.shtml. This criticism is supported by data showing that the most “liberal” members
59
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specifically targeted, as those are the ones that were
removed.”66 The majority of removed BIA members had prior
work experience in private practice, immigration advocacy
organizations, and academia.67
Ashcroft’s reforms immediately created one desired
effect: the BIA backlog has significantly diminished. In 2003,
17% of IJ decisions were appealed to the BIA.68 The percentage
of BIA appeals has decreased each year since the reforms were
implemented, and only 9% of decisions were appealed to the
BIA in 2006.69 The number of “summary affirmances,” in which
Board members affirm IJ decisions without stating whether
they agree with the IJ’s reasoning, increased from 3% to 60% in
a seven-month period during 2002.70 Moreover, BIA members
increasingly held in favor of the government and against

of the BIA were fired. Legomsky, supra note 52, at 376, 376 nn.38, 39 (citing Peter J.
Levinson, The Façade of Quasi-Justicial Independence in Immigration Appellate
Adjudications, 9 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 1154, 1164 (2004)).
66
Telephone Interview with Dana Leigh Marks, President, Nat’l Ass’n of
Immigration Judges (Sept. 14, 2007) [hereinafter Marks Interview]. (The National
Association of Immigration Judges is a union.)
67
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 353. Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales announced in September 2006 that he would add four member positions to
the BIA. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9,
2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/August/06_ag_520.html. Notably,
he “did not suggest that the members who had been appointed under a Democratic
Administration and removed to other jobs . . . would be restored to the Board.” RamjiNogales et al., supra note 11, at 386-87.
68
See OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECHNOLOGY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE
OF IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2006 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK A2
(2007) [hereinafter 2006 YEARBOOK], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/
fy06syb.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2008).
69
Id. One reason for the decrease in appeals may be recognition on the part
of litigants that appealing to the BIA will almost inevitably result in an affirmation of
the IJ’s decision, requiring a subsequent appeal to the Circuit Courts. Without the
resources to successfully appeal a decision to the Circuit Courts, litigants may be
choosing not to appeal at all. See Cruz, supra note 11, at 508 (“[M]any immigrants lack
the financial means to pursue an appeal to the circuit court, to file a motion to
reconsider, and to litigate upon remand.”). This logic, of course, was part of the goal of
the streamlining process.
70
Alexander, supra note 8, at 12; DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP, BOARD OF
IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT app. 25
(2003), http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pdf; see also
Martin S. Krezalek, Note, How to Minimize the Risk of Violating Due Process Rights
While Preserving the BIA’s Ability to Affirm Without Opinion, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
277, 279 (2007) (arguing that summary affirmances potentially violate the rights of
foreign nationals).
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foreign nationals; Board decisions granting relief to foreign
nationals fell from 25% to 10%.71
However, the BIA still suffers from a heavy workload.
In 2006, the eleven members of the BIA completed 41,479
appeals.72 According to Chief Judge of the Second Circuit John
M. Walker, “For the BIA to keep current on its docket, even
with streamlining so that the disposition is by a single judge,
each judge must dispose of nearly 4,000 cases a year—or about
80 per week—a virtually impossible task.”73
Ashcroft’s reforms have been heavily criticized for
lessening the quality of work performed by the BIA.74 Indeed,
immigration judges themselves recognize the problems
inherent in this limited review process. The President of the
National Association of Immigration Judges, Dana Leigh
Marks, noted that many immigration judges were trained to
render oral decisions from the bench, with no need to “make it
formal and pretty” because the BIA would serve as the
“polishers” for the decisions.75 Now, “the BIA is issuing all of
these affirmances without opinion and we have no resources to
do a top-notch job from the beginning.”76
In addition to the structural impact of these reforms,
the changes raise considerable ethical implications. For
example, the task of reviewing both the decisions and the
behavior of immigration judges has fallen on the circuit courts
because BIA members are less able to thoroughly review IJ
determinations. But circuit courts were not designed—and
should not be required—to monitor ethical behavior. The
71

Alexander, supra note 8, at 13 (noting that “these changes increased by
thousands the number of noncitizens whose administrative appeals were rejected
without written explanation”).
72
2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at S2.
73
Statement of Hon. John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Apr. 3, 2006,
at 3 [hereinafter Walker Statement], available at http://www.aila.org/content/
default.aspx?docid=18996 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007); see also Albathani v. INS, 318
F.3d 365, 378 (1st Cir. 2003) (board member decided 50 cases on October 31, 2002, a
“rate of one every ten minutes over the course of a nine-hour day”); Alexander, supra
note 8, at 21.
74
See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 8, at 21. Immigration attorney Kerry Bretz
remarked, “Motion practice at the BIA is a joke. I get denials where it’s clear they
haven’t even read the motions.” Mark Hamblett, Extraordinary Measures Reduce
Circuit’s Immigration Case Backlog, N.Y. L.J., June 5, 2007, at 1.
75
Marks Interview, supra note 66.
76
Alexander, supra note 8, at 12-13 (citing Solomon Moore & Ann M.
Simmons, Immigrant Pleas Crushing Federal Appellate Courts: As Caseloads
Skyrocket, Judges Blame the Work Done by the Board of Immigration Appeals, L.A.
TIMES, May 2, 2005, at 1).
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potential for biased or incompetent behavior has significantly
increased since circuit courts simply cannot review every
immigration case for judicial misconduct.
Ashcroft’s reforms can be credited for bringing the crisis
in the immigration courts to light: the BIA is no longer
“cleaning up” immigration judges’ improper decisions, and
appellate justices and the public are now more aware of the
wide scope of the problem.77 However, while the reforms may
indeed raise public consciousness, unethical behavior is
harming litigants on an ongoing basis.
E.

Current Disciplinary Procedures for Immigration Judges

Neither the BIA nor the courts of appeal are designed to
monitor complaints of ethical misconduct in immigration
courts. In 2003 the EOIR Director established a procedure for
evaluating behavioral complaints against immigration judges.78
Under this system, EOIR and the Office of the Chief
Immigration Judge are responsible for monitoring complaints,
and complaint reports are “generated on a monthly basis for
internal use only.”79 The reports are sent to the EOIR Director,
and are intended to provide a “centralized and comprehensive
compilation of written and oral complaints” regarding
immigration judges’ conduct on the bench, as well as the status
of the complaints.80 Pursuant to this structure, the EOIR
Director has the responsibility to monitor the patterns of
misconduct on the part of immigration judges.
Complaints about the conduct of individual immigration
judges are brought to the OCIJ orally or in writing, and are
usually sent to the OCIJ by the Assistant Chief Immigration
Judge (“ACIJ”) with supervisory authority over the judge in
question.81 Beginning in 2007, complaints may also be sent to
the individual serving in the newly created Assistant Chief

77

Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 14. Although EOIR and the OCIJ
established an “Immigration Court Evaluation Program” (“ICEP”) in 1997 to evaluate
court performance, the individual hearing decisions of judges are “the only aspect of
court evaluation that are not evaluated.” Id. at 13. The ICEP focuses instead on the
“courts’ organizational structure, caseload, and workflow processes to assess the
efficiency of the court in accomplishing its mission.” Id.
79
Id at 14.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 15.
78
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Immigration Judge for Conduct and Professionalism position.82
Complaints may be submitted by a variety of persons,
including “immigrants, the immigrants’ attorneys, DHS trial
attorneys, other immigration judges, other court staff, OCIJ
headquarters staff, and others.”83 The OCIJ notifies the EOIR
Director of a complaint filed against an immigration judge,
even before the OCIJ has an opportunity to verify the accuracy
of the claim.84 Thus, the EOIR Director is presumably wellinformed: in addition to receiving monthly compilations of
written and oral complaints, the EOIR Director is also notified
of individual complaints as they arise.
Despite the monitoring role of the EOIR Director, and
the newly created advisory role of the ACIJ for Conduct and
Professionalism, the ACIJ with supervisory authority over the
judge is directly responsible for addressing most complaints.85
In an August 2006 report, the Government Accountability
Office (“GAO”) disclosed that between fiscal years 2001 to 2005,
the OCIJ received 129 complaints against IJs.86 The OCIJ had
taken 134 actions in response to 121 complaints as of
September 30, 2005:87
[A]bout 25 percent (34 [complaints]) were found to have no merit;
about 25 percent resulted in disciplinary actions against the judges
that included counseling (18), written reprimand (9), oral reprimand
(3), and suspension (4); about 22 percent (29) were referred to DOJ’s
Office of Professional Responsibility or Office of the Inspector
General or EOIR’s office of General Counsel for further review; and
the remaining 28 percent (37) resulted in various other actions such

82
This position, created in 2007 as part of Attorney General Gonzales’s
reforms, is designed to “review[] and monitor[] all complaints against immigration
judges” and help “ensure that investigations of complaints are concluded as efficiently
as possible.” AILA-EOIR Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions, Apr. 11, 2007, at 3
[hereinafter AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
eoir/statspub/eoiraila041107.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2008). Notably, however, the
ACIJ for Conduct and Professionalism does not hold disciplinary authority over IJs.
See id. (listing the position’s responsibilities as monitoring, reviewing, and tracking all
complaints).
83
GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 27.
84
Id. at 28.
85
Id. An exception exists for complaints concerning allegations relating to
the “exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate, litigate, or provide legal
advice.” Id. Such complaints are referred directly to the Office of Professional
Responsibility, which is responsible for handling such allegations. Id.
86
Id.
87
Id. The remaining eight complaints were still under review. Id.
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In light of recent publicity highlighting the prevalence
of unethical conduct on the part of IJs,89 the fact that only 129
complaints were filed over a four-year period is somewhat
startling. In reality, however, EOIR’s administrative complaint
procedure suffers from several weaknesses.90 These limitations
may explain the low number of reported complaints. Also,
recent reforms to the judicial review process for immigration
cases may have encouraged litigants to file appeals of their
cases in circuit courts,91 rather than filing disciplinary
complaints that have no effect on the substantive outcome of a
litigant’s case. Individuals suffering from biased, incompetent,
or otherwise unethical behavior on the part of immigration
judges should have a more effective means of recourse than
appealing to the circuit courts or relying on the inadequate IJ
disciplinary process.
III.

THE EXISTENCE OF AN ETHICAL CRISIS

A.

Judicial Ethics Generally

The American judicial system is premised upon the
ability of judges to be ethical and fair. Judges are held to the
highest standards of professional behavior because of the
powerful positions they hold.92 The American Bar Association
published a revised “Model Code of Judicial Conduct” in
February 2007.93 This Code applies to “anyone who is
authorized to perform judicial functions;” the newly revised
code specifically includes justices of the peace, magistrates,
court commissioners, and members of the administrative
judiciary within that definition.94

88
89
90
91
92

GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 28-29.
See infra Part III.D-E.
See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.
See generally sources cited supra note 18.
JEFFREY M. SHAMAN ET AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHICS § 1.01 (3d ed.

2000).
93
AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2007)
[hereinafter ABA JUDICIAL CODE], available at http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/
ABA_MCJC_approved.pdf.
94
Id., para. I(B) of “Application” section, at 6. The National Conference of
Administrative Law Judges endorsed a “Model Code of Judicial Conduct” for Federal
Administrative Law Judges in February 1989.
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As part of their ethical duties, all judges must make
competent decisions in an impartial manner, free from personal
bias or prejudice.95 Even so, judges work with varying degrees
of competence and are generally somewhat involved in the
affairs of society at large.
A judge’s involvement in the “outside world” is not
necessarily a negative characteristic, for such involvement can
“enrich[] the judicial temperament and enhance[] a judge’s
ability to make difficult decisions.”96 In reality, the balance
between the ideal of judicial impartiality and the reality of
personal preferences can be difficult to strike. This problem of
personal bias or prejudice becomes even more nuanced when it
is held against groups of people; unlike business or financial
interests, personal bias is subjective and difficult to identify.97
According to the ABA, the term “bias” is commonly
understood to indicate favoritism or opposition by a judge to a
concept or idea, while the term “prejudice” suggests “specially
favoring or opposing individuals.”98 The ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct specifically prohibits actions manifesting
either bias or prejudice in the performance of judicial duties.99
The determination of a judge’s competence can be easier
to identify than bias. The ABA declared in the 2007 Model
Code of Judicial Conduct that judicial competence “requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation
reasonably necessary to perform a judge’s responsibilities of
judicial office.”100 One state supreme court established the test
for incompetence as “whether the conduct at issue establishes
that the [judge] lacks the requisite ability, knowledge,
judgment, or diligence to consistently and capably discharge
the duties of the office he or she holds.”101 Regardless of
jurisdiction, judges are expected to bring a basic level of
neutrality, knowledge, skill, and dedication to the cases
brought before them.
95

SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 4.01.
Id.
97
See id. § 4.04.
98
AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORTER’S EXPLANATION OF CHANGES: ABA MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, 2007, Rule 2.3, Explanation of Comments, cmt. [1], at 16. This
article will use the term “bias” and “prejudice” in accordance with the ABA definitions.
99
ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.3.
100
Id. Rule 2.5, cmt. [1].
101
In re Baber, 847 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Mo. 1993) (en banc); see also In re
Hunter, 823 So. 2d 325, 336 (La. 2002) (adopting the definition of judicial competence
used in In re Baber).
96
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Accordingly, federal rules, case law, and ethical codes of
conduct seek to ensure judicial competence, professionalism,
and impartiality.102 For example, most judges are required to
disqualify themselves if they hold personal antagonism against
a party, or hold “[a]nimosity or irrational bias, such as racial
prejudice,” against a particular group.103 Such beliefs would
obviously affect the ability of a judge to decide a case
impartially based only on facts and law, and would undermine
the judicial system.
B.

Ethical Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges

Immigration courts in the United States are distinct
from other courts, and the fact that immigration judges do not
operate under the judicial branch has serious ethical
implications. As a unique body of adjudicators, immigration
judges must follow several codes of conduct. Because they are
employees of the executive branch, IJs are subject to the
Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch.104 In addition, IJs and BIA members must follow the
Department of Justice Codes of Conduct,105 the EOIR Ethics
Manual,106 and management policies of both EOIR and the
DOJ. The DOJ also recently proposed “Codes of Conduct for the
102
See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b) (2000) (requiring a federal judge to
disqualify himself in any case in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned); ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.11 (same). Of course, the laws
and rules governing judicial conduct also address issues of conflicts of interest, ex parte
communications, and financial disclosures, among other things. Because a thorough
examination of each of these issues as they relate to IJs is beyond the scope of this
Article, the focus here is on the issues of bias and competence.
103
SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 92, § 4.04.
104
These standards are codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 2635 (2007) and 5 C.F.R. pt.
3801 (2007).
105
The Regulations provide:

Employees of the Department of Justice are subject to the executive branchwide Standards of Ethical Conduct at 5 C.F.R. part 2635, the Department of
Justice regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 3801 which supplement the executive
branch-wide standards, the executive branch-wide financial disclosure
regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 2634 and the executive branch-wide employee
responsibilities and conduct regulations at 5 C.F.R. part 735.
28 C.F.R. § 45.1 (2007).
106
The Ethics Manual, distributed in 2001, is designed for members of the
Board of Immigration Appeals, Immigration Judges, and Administrative Law Judges
Employed by the Executive Office for Immigration Review. See Executive Office
for Immigration Review, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ethics Manual [hereinafter EOIR Ethics
Manual], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub.htm (last visited Feb. 20,
2008).
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Immigration Judges and Board Members,” which are not yet in
final form.107 As an attorney, an IJ is also subject to the rules of
professional conduct in the state(s) where the IJ is a member of
the bar and in the state where she performs her duties.108
Notably, the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct,
which is used as a model for most state judicial codes of
conduct, is not binding on IJs and members of the BIA; rather,
the ABA Model Code is intended to be “aspirational” for IJs
and BIA members.109 In addition, the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges is not binding on IJs or BIA members
because they are not members of the judicial branch.110
C.

The Special Need for Ethical Behavior in Immigration
Court

Given so many applicable rules of conduct, the existence
of an ethical crisis in immigration courts may seem surprising.
After all, with six to seven sets of rules potentially serving as
guidance, how could an immigration judge fail to act in an
ethical manner?

107

The proposed text of the IJ Codes is published in the Federal Register. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Codes of Conduct for the Immigration Judges and Board Members, 72
Fed. Reg. 35,510-13 (June 28, 2007).
108
Id. These various codes of conduct have many parallels, including
prohibitions against bias and prejudice, conflicts of interest, impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety, and restrictions on extra-judicial activities such as political
activities. The codes also require a minimum level of competence on the part of judges.
Cf. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, available
at http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/calbar_extend.jsp?cid=10158 (last visited Feb.
20, 2008); ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93; and CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED
STATES JUDGES (2002) [hereinafter CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES], available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/guide/vol2/ch1.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2008).
109
EOIR Ethics Manual, supra note 106, at 1 n.1 (“[T]he Model Code of
Judicial Conduct is not binding on EOIR Judges, but its canons and commentary
present aspirational goals.”). The ABA, which published an updated version of the
Model Code for Judicial Conduct in April 2007, intended the Model Code to apply to
members of the “administrative law judiciary.” ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93,
Part I(B). Moreover, IJs are not subject to state judicial ethics codes governing state
judges. While extension of state judicial ethics codes on federal IJs is arguably valid
under the McDade Amendment, it would add more standards of conduct to the already
considerable number of codes applicable to them. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2008). As an
alternative, EOIR should focus on consolidating the ethical guidelines of IJs into one
comprehensive standard of conduct. See infra Part V.B.
110
The Code of Conduct for United States Judges applies to United States
circuit judges, district judges, Court of International Trade judges, Court of Federal
Claims judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES,
supra note 108, ch. I. The Tax Court, Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, and Court
of Appeals for the Armed Forces have also adopted this Code. Id.
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In reality, the number of applicable codes is itself
indicative of a problem: Immigration judges do not have the
time or resources to review multiple codes of conduct on a
regular basis. Moreover, actual training in ethics-related issues
is substantially lacking for immigration judges. One former IJ
reported that EOIR’s training conferences for immigration
judges would occasionally include an hour or so related to
ethics, but there was “certainly no local training of judges on
ethics issues.”111 In fact, training conferences for immigration
judges were completely suspended for several years due to
budgetary constraints.112 During those years, immigration
judges did not receive any formal ethical training at all. The
DOJ again suspended training conferences for immigration
judges in February 2008 due to “budget constraints.”113
In addition, the heavy workload of immigration judges
leaves no time for discussions regarding ethical conduct. When
asked whether immigration judges spoke with each other about
ethical codes of conduct, a former IJ replied, “Nobody even
talked about it. The judges I served with didn’t know about
[ethical codes of conduct]. Their whole focus was on their
calendar, wondering ‘how am I going to get through these five
merits hearings I squeezed in today?’”114 With the pressures of
a busy calendar, guidelines relating to ethical conduct are
considered a low priority.
Immigration judges undeniably face a great number of
challenges in their daily work. With limited resources, they are
expected to make determinations which are often life-or-death
decisions for the litigants before them.115 Many cases coming
111

Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
Denise Slavin, President of the National Association of Immigration
Judges, commented in 2006, “We [IJs] are so low on funds. We haven’t had a break off
the bench for three years. . . . We have had no training conferences, no cultural
sensitivity training.” Adams, supra note 65. For recommendations regarding formal
ethics training for IJs, see infra Part V.B.
113
Letter from Dana Leigh Marks, President, & Denise Noonan Slavin, Vice
President, National Association of Immigration Judges to Chief Judge David L. Neal,
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge (Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter NAIJ Letter] (on file
with author). Immigration judges protested the cancellation of training for IJs, noting
that the decision “will impact adversely on the quality of our work” because
“[c]ontinuous training is essential to maintain any kind of expertise, which we are
expected to have, in this area of the law.” Id.
114
Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
115
As the U.S. Government Accountability Office recognized, IJs must balance
“adjudicating their caseload (all cases awaiting adjudication) in a timely manner while
at the same time ensuring that the rights of the immigrants appearing before them are
protected.” GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 2.
112
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before immigration judges involve complex legal or factual
issues, but, in 2006, only 35% of litigants were represented by
counsel.116 Relevant evidence is often unavailable, including
witnesses or documents that could prove persecution in a home
country.117 Also, only 11.6% of immigration court proceedings in
the 2006 fiscal year were conducted in English.118 As a result, it
can be difficult for immigration judges to identify relevant
issues or make “credibility determinations” to decide whether a
litigant is telling the truth. The latter point is arguably the
most important: since immigration judges are responsible for
the crucial determinations of a litigant’s credibility that often
decide the case, a litigant’s courtroom demeanor can have a
substantial impact on the success of his claim.119
Ashcroft’s streamlining reforms, minimizing judicial
review of an immigration judge’s opinions, place an even
greater emphasis on a foreign national’s initial proceeding
before the IJ. Unless a litigant is financially and practically
able to appeal a removal order to the circuit courts, a foreign
national’s ability to stay in the United States essentially lies in
the hands of the immigration judge.
For this reason, fair and competent adjudication in
immigration court proceedings is critical. Indeed, “trivial
mistakes [in immigration court] can unwittingly lead to flawed
decisions with grave consequences.”120 Individuals seeking relief
before an immigration judge must therefore be guaranteed

116

See 2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at A1.
Alexander, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that the “ability to gather evidence
may be blocked by the very government alleged to be the persecutor”).
118
2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at F1. In fiscal year 2006, 252 different
languages were spoken in immigration court proceedings, a nineteen percent increase
in language diversity since fiscal year 2002. Id.; see also Walker Statement, supra note
73 (discussing the “unique nature of immigration hearings,” wherein “[a]liens
frequently do not speak English, so the Immigration Judge must work with a
translator, and the Immigration Judge normally must go over particular testimony
several times before he can be confident that he is getting an accurate answer from the
alien”).
119
This is an especially important issue in light of the passage of the REAL ID
Act of 2005, which added a provision to the asylum statute instructing IJs to “evaluate
demeanor and consistency of statements to determine credibility.” Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami
Relief of 2005. Div. B (REAL ID Act of 2005), Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 101(a), 119 Stat.
231, 303 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(B)(iii) (Supp. 2005)); see Katherine E. Melloy,
Note, Telling Truths: How the REAL ID Act’s Credibility Provisions Affect Women
Asylum Seekers, 92 IOWA L. REV. 637, 640 (2007).
120
Ming Shi Xue v. BIA, 439 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is not
surprising that the position of overburdened immigration judges and overworked
courts has become a matter of wide concern.”).
117
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certain procedural rights, including the opportunity to present
evidence on their behalf in removal proceedings.121 Additionally,
a person seeking withholding of removal or relief under the
Convention Against Torture is entitled to a fair hearing under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution.122 In order to ensure the fairness of a removal
proceeding, the arbiter must be neutral, meaning “one who has
not pre-decided the case and who is not predisposed to
disregard a witness’s testimony . . . .”123
In addition to neutrality, immigration judges must
maintain a basic level of competence in immigration law. This
is especially true in light of the unique and difficult nature of
immigration cases. Denise Slavin, former President of the
National Association of Immigration Judges, noted,
“Immigration law is very complex. So generally speaking, it’s
very good to have someone coming into this area with [an]
immigration background. It’s very difficult, for those who don’t,
to catch up.”124 Also, immigration law changes often, and IJs
must be able to apply the most current laws to each case.
Unfortunately, in recent years the ability of
immigration judges to render competent decisions, and to set
aside their personal biases or prejudices against litigants, has
come into question.125 Indeed, the very fact that Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales proposed a new set of codes of
conduct indicates the government’s acknowledgment that a
crisis exists in immigration court.126
121

8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(B) (2006).
Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014, 1025 (8th Cir. 2007); see also Al Khouri v.
Ashcroft, 362 F.3d 461, 464 (8th Cir. 2004) (“The Fifth Amendment’s due process clause
mandates that removal proceedings be fundamentally fair.”).
123
Tun, 485 F.3d at 1025; see also Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242
(1980) (“The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested
tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.”); Lopez-Umanzor v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 1049,
1056 (9th Cir. 2005) (Due Process violation existed because IJ refused to hear relevant
testimony because of a prejudgment about the credibility of the witness).
124
Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44, at A1.
125
See sources cited supra note 11.
126
See infra Part IV.B. Alberto Gonzales resigned from office in August 2007,
and his last day in office was September 17, 2007. Remarks of Attorney General
Alberto R. Gonzales Announcing His Resignation, Aug. 27, 2007, available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2007/ag_speech_070827.html. Gonzales’s reform
directives have not changed since his resignation. See Kent B. Alexander, The Future of
the Justice Department, WASH. POST, Aug. 28, 2007 (noting that the Department of
Justice will continue its work even if there are changes among political appointees). On
September 17, 2007, President George W. Bush nominated Judge Michael Mukasey to
replace Attorney General Gonzales. Michael Abramowitz & Dan Eggen, With Justice
Pick, Bush Hopes to Avoid a Fight, WASH. POST, Sept. 18, 2007. The United States
122
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Statistical Inconsistencies

Considering the importance of the IJ’s decision-making
process, it is especially alarming to note that scholars
conducting recent statistical analyses have revealed evidence of
inconsistent decisions made by immigration judges.127 Despite
the fact that EOIR’s mission statement guarantees “uniform
application of the nation’s immigration laws in all cases,”
studies assessing the grant and deny rates of immigration
judges in the same type of case show that “immigration courts
are failing to meet this fundamental standard.”128
A recent study on this issue by Professors Jaya RamjiNogales, Andrew Schoenholtz, and Philip Schrag, published in
the Stanford Law Review (“Ramji-Nogales study”), identified
disturbing inconsistencies in the adjudication of immigration
law claims.129 Their analysis of immigration courts throughout
the country revealed “remarkable variation in decisionmaking” among different immigration officials, regions, judicial
circuits, and years.130 For example, a Chinese asylum seeker in
the Atlanta Immigration Court had a seven percent chance of
winning asylum, compared to a seventy-six percent chance of
winning asylum for a Chinese applicant in the Orlando
Immigration Court.131 The study also examined grant rate
disparities between judges from the same immigration court.132
Incredibly, the study found that three out of four immigration
courts housed judges with large grant rate disparities from
other judges, meaning they were “out of step with the other
judges in their courthouse.”133 Indeed, asylum applicants who
Senate confirmed Judge Mukasey as Attorney General on November 8, 2007. Laurie
Kellman, Mukasey Confirmed as Attorney General, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 2007.
127
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 372. This 2007 study parallels
results discovered in a 2000 study published by the San Jose Mercury News. See
Fredric N. Tulsky, Asylum Seekers Face Capricious Legal System; Some Judges Grant
Asylum in Only 1 in 20 Cases, Others in 1 in Every 2; Former Government Immigration
Lawyers Are Toughest Asylum Judges; Rulings Vary Widely, Even for Applicants with
Similar Stories, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Oct. 18, 2000, at A1. For data results, see
TRAC, Judges Show Disparity in Denying Asylum, July 31, 2006, available at
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/160 (last visited July 22, 2007). For an excellent
analysis of this data and its implications, see Alexander, supra note 8, at 21-25.
128
Alexander, supra note 8, at 21 (citing DOJ Mission Statement, supra note
22).
129
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 296.
130
Id. at 302.
131
Id. at 330-31.
132
Id. at 333.
133
Id. at 333-34.
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appeared before the highest granting judge were nearly thirty
times more likely to win their claims than applicants appearing
before the lowest granting judge.134 These statistics are
critically important, for they indicate that immigration law is
not being applied in a uniform manner. As the study’s authors
point out, the outcome of a refugee’s asylum claim depends
most on the identity of the judge assigned to hear his case.135
Disparities in the grant rates of immigration judges
were successfully correlated to differences in biographical
information of the judges.136 For example, the study found that
female immigration judges granted asylum in 53.8% of asylum
cases, while male judges granted relief in only 37.3% of asylum
cases.137 In addition, immigration judges with prior work
experience on the prosecutorial side of immigration proceedings
were 24% less likely to grant asylum than those with no prior
government experience.138 Notably, all judges with immigration
law backgrounds appointed by the Bush administration since
2001 had prosecutorial experience.139
These statistics cannot be relied upon to show unethical
behavior per se on the part of individual judges. However,
scholars have suggested the mere fact that such inconsistencies
existed within a court is some “evidence that the process is
inaccurate and unfair.”140 Indeed, the Ramji-Nogales study’s
authors concluded that the great deviation in grant rates for
some immigration judges suggests that an adjudicator could be
“imposing his or her own philosophical attitude (or personal
level of skepticism about applicants’ testimony) to the cases
under consideration.”141 The study’s authors believed their data
raised “serious questions about whether the results of cases are
excessively influenced by personal characteristics of the
judges.”142 Similarly, Mr. Alexander cited statistics showing
134

Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 330-32.
Id. at 296.
136
Id. at 296.
137
Id. at 342.
138
Id. at 345-46.
139
Goldstein & Eggen, supra note 44, at A1.
140
Alexander, supra note 8, at 29; see also Jason D. Vendel, Note, General
Bias and Administrative Law Judges: Is There a Remedy for Social Security Disability
Claimants?, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 773 (2005) (“[A] practical method of proof [to
show judicial bias] is by examining multiple decisions—either statistically or in some
other systematic manner.”).
141
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 378.
142
Id. at 304. Similar concerns existed regarding grant rates for asylum
officers: “officers who adjudicate asylum applications in some of the eight regional
135
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disparities among immigration judges’ decisions as “evidence
of unfairness and inaccuracy” and an “indicator of the
immigration court crisis.”143
While all judges bring their personal experience to the
bench, ethical standards exist to ensure that judges do not rely
too heavily on their own preferences when making decisions.
Evidence of disparities in decision-making signifies that judges’
personal preferences may unduly influence their decisions in
court, since “inconsistency among judges suggests that bias and
prejudice are influencing the outcomes.”144 For example, as the
Ramji-Nogales study noted, “immigration lawyers have
sometimes complained that after an immigrant judge is lied to
several times by nationals of a particular country, the judge
tends to suspect that all nationals of that country are liars.”145
The notion that judges are basing their determinations on
personal preferences rather than on the law epitomizes bias on
the bench. Thus, in addition to calling for structural reform to
respond to the crisis in immigration courts, the Ramji-Nogales
study highlights the need for uniform ethical standards and
strict enforcement of such standards for immigration judges.
Unfortunately, with diminished monitoring of individual judges and courtrooms, it is more difficult to identify
potentially problematic behavior.146 In reality, the burden of
reprimanding immigration judges has fallen to the only
persons thoroughly reviewing their conduct: federal appellate
judges.
E.

Circuit Court Frustration

The frustration of circuit court judges, who are faced
with the onerous task of reviewing opinions from immigration
judges that are usually summarily affirmed by the BIA, is
rising. Since the 2003 reforms eliminating internal review
procedures for immigration cases went into effect, appeals to
the circuit courts have increased exponentially. For example,
while the Ninth Circuit received 11,238 petitions for review in
the thirty years between April 1, 1972 and April 1, 2002, it
offices of the Department of Homeland Security’s asylum office appear to have grant
rates that reflect personal outlooks rather than an office consensus.” Id. at 375.
143
Alexander, supra note 8, at 21.
144
See Alexander, supra note 8, at 25.
145
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 381-82.
146
EOIR does have procedures for complaints against IJs, but those
procedures are inadequate. See discussion infra Part IV.C.2.a.
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received an incredible 18,263 petitions for review in just three
years between April 1, 2002 and October 1, 2005.147
The sheer number of petitions is not the only problem
plaguing circuit courts. In an influential 2005 opinion voicing
the concerns of appellate judges, Judge Posner of the Seventh
Circuit cited an extensive pattern of judicial bias and
inappropriate behavior on the part of immigration judges.148
Circuit judges following Judge Posner’s lead are increasingly
reprimanding immigration judges for problematic behavior.149
In 2007, the Second Circuit took the highly unusual step of
singling out an individual immigration judge for egregious
behavior on the bench, and recommending the Justice

147
Palmer, supra note 18, at 14 n.3. Similarly, the Second Circuit received
only 2360 petitions for review between April 1, 1972 and April 1, 2002, but received
7723 petitions for review between April 1, 2002, and October 1, 2005. Id. at 14 n.2.
148
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005). Judge Posner’s
list of circuit cases rebuking the conduct of IJs and the BIA includes Dawoud v.
Gonzales, 424 F.3d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The IJ’s opinion is riddled with
inappropriate and extraneous comments . . . .”); Ssali v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 556, 563
(7th Cir. 2005) (“This very significant mistake suggests that the Board was not aware
of the most basic facts of [the petitioner’s] case . . . .”); Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales, 421
F.3d 589, 594 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The procedure that the IJ employed in this case is an
affront to [petitioner’s] right to be heard.”); Soumahoro v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 732, 738
(7th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (finding the IJ’s factual conclusion to be “totally
unsupported by the record”); Grupee v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1026, 1028 (7th Cir. 2005)
(finding the IJ’s unexplained conclusion to be “hard to take seriously”). Noting that
“[o]ther circuits have been as critical,” Judge Posner cited cases from different circuits,
including Wang v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The
tone, the tenor, the disparagement, and the sarcasm of the IJ seem more appropriate to
a court television show than a federal court proceeding.”); Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
426 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding the IJ’s finding to be “grounded solely on
speculation and conjecture”); Fiadjoe v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 411 F.3d 135, 154-55
(3d Cir. 2005) (noting that the IJ’s “hostile” and “extraordinarily abusive” conduct
toward petitioner “by itself would require a rejection of his credibility finding”);
Korytnyuk v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 272, 292 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]t is the IJ’s conclusion, not
[the petitioner’s] testimony, that ‘strains credulity.’”). Id.
149
See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that
the IJ’s “intemperate” manner and sarcasm with petitioner “raised substantial
questions as to his bias and hostility toward” the asylum applicant); N’Diom v.
Gonzales, 442 F.3d 494, 500 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., concurring) (noting the
“significantly increasing rate at which adjudication lacking in reason, logic, and effort
from . . . immigration courts is reaching the federal circuits”); Sholla v. Gonzales, 492
F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2007) (IJ denied asylum even though “the record compels any
reasonable factfinder to conclude that [the applicant] suffered past persecution on a
protected ground”); Mece v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 562, 572 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The Board’s
failure to find clear error in the immigration judge’s adverse credibility determination
leaves us, we are frank to say, more than a little puzzled.”); Iao v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d
530, 533 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The immigration judge’s opinion cannot be regarded as
reasoned . . . .”); Recinos de Leon v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2005);
Zahedi v. INS, 222 F.3d 1157, 1166-68 (9th Cir. 2000). See generally Pasha v. Gonzales,
433 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2005).
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Department review each of this judge’s decisions.150 The judge
was later removed from the bench.151
Immigration lawyers practicing in immigration court
believe that biased and incompetent behavior is widespread on
the immigration bench.152 Anecdotal evidence of this type of
unethical conduct is plentiful in immigration cases recently
reviewed by the circuit courts. Two 2007 cases particularly
highlight the problems of bias and incompetence in
immigration court.
1. The Biased Immigration Judge: Tun v. Gonzales
To understand the impact of bias on the bench, we
return to the story of Naing Tun, a Burmese citizen seeking
asylum in the United States. In May 2007, in response to Tun’s
appeal of the IJ’s and BIA’s denials of his asylum claim, the
Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of bias in immigration
courtrooms.153 As a member of a minority group in Burma, Tun
filed an application for asylum claiming torture, past
persecution, and a fear of future persecution. Tun alleged he
had been arrested, interrogated, and beaten due to his political
activities.154 He further claimed he had been incarcerated for
three years and forced to do hard labor.155
To prove his claims, Tun submitted two expert opinions.
The first was a report by a recognized expert on conditions in
Burma. Despite the expert’s strong qualifications in the field
and his report speaking to a “critical, contested issue in the
case,”156 the IJ concluded that the expert’s document would “not
be given any weight” because the government was unable to
cross-examine him.157 The second expert opinion, also excluded
by the immigration judge, was a medical report submitted as
evidence of the residual trauma Tun endured due to torture at
the hands of Burmese authorities.158 Notwithstanding the
150
Ray Rivera, Court Urges Review of New York Judge’s Immigration Cases
That Are on Appeal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at 1.
151
Nina Bernstein, Immigration Judge Is Reassigned to a Desk Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 13, 2007, at B1.
152
Interviews with anonymous immigration law practitioners, S.F., Calif.,
July and August 2007 (notes on file with author).
153
Tun v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir. 2007).
154
Id. at 1018.
155
Id.
156
Id. at 1017-18.
157
Id. at 1019.
158
Id. at 1019-20.
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physician’s extensive experience treating victims of trauma and
volunteer medical work in numerous war-torn countries, the IJ
concluded the physician was not a qualified expert, in part
because she had not personally been to Burma.159
These actions on the part of the IJ demonstrate an
unwillingness to consider properly proffered evidence
submitted by an asylum applicant.160 However, the bias of this
immigration judge against Tun became even more apparent as
his hearing continued. The IJ and the attorneys involved in the
case questioned Tun through a Burmese interpreter.161 Tun
provided detailed testimony of his arrest, beatings, and other
forms of mistreatment caused by the Burmese government for
his political activities. However, there were “at least a dozen
instances” where Tun indicated that he did not understand the
translator, and “at least a dozen other instances” where Tun’s
responses, as provided to the court by the translator, were
“confusing or not directly responsive to the questions originally
asked in English.”162 A native Burmese speaker present in the
courtroom interrupted the proceedings to inform the
immigration judge that “the official translator was not correctly
translating the questions and answers.”163 After the hearing,
the IJ declined Tun’s request to reopen the record or hold a
new hearing based on translation errors.164 Relying on Tun’s
allegedly “inconsistent” testimony, the IJ concluded that Tun
lacked credibility.165 Based on her adverse credibility
determinations, the immigration judge denied Tun’s request for
asylum.
The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed Tun’s
appeal, holding that the record provided examples to support
the IJ’s finding of inconsistencies.166 Upon review, the Eight
Circuit disagreed with the IJ’s and BIA’s conclusions. In doing
so, the court considered the IJ’s exclusions of the expert’s

159

Tun, 485 F.3d at 1020.
Immigration judges are required to advise a litigant that “he or she will
have a reasonable opportunity to examine and object to the evidence against him or
her,” and “to present evidence in his or her own behalf.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(a)(4) (2007).
161
Tun, 485 F.3d at 1020.
162
Id. at 1022. The Eighth Circuit quoted the improper translation in detail in
the opinion. Id. at 1022 n.2.
163
Id. at 1017.
164
Id. at 1024.
165
Id. at 1030-31.
166
Id. at 1025.
160
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reports and evaluated the alleged inconsistencies in Tun’s
testimony.
Regarding the testimony of the Burmese expert, the
court held the expert was undoubtedly qualified to report on
country conditions in Burma. Moreover, the court noted that
the presence of an author of a report and his availability
for cross-examination are not “absolute requirements” for
submission of the report in immigration proceedings.167 The
court found the IJ’s decision to “exclude the report of a facially
unobjectionable expert without any explanation as to why
cross-examination was needed” was “unfair and unsupportable.”168
The court similarly found that the second expert, a
physician, was clearly qualified to offer “critical corroborating
testimony.”169 As such, the court determined that the exclusion
of Dr. Frye’s report affected the outcome of the proceedings,
since the IJ “completely ignored the most valuable
corroborating evidence of [Tun’s] torture.”170 The court noted
that the IJ’s desire to conclude the hearing in time to allow the
court translator to “make a six o’clock flight” later that day
seemed to have substantial weight in the IJ’s decision to
exclude Dr. Frye’s testimony.171 Significant from an ethical
perspective, the court recognized that the IJ’s actions
suggested she “may not have acted as a neutral arbiter.”172
Lastly, the court was “troubled by the lack of
consideration given by the IJ and the Board” to the issue of
translation error, especially since all “indicia of erroneous
translation were present” in Tun’s case.173 The errors performed
by the IJ went beyond simply ignoring evidence of erroneous
translation. The IJ also improperly relied on the resulting
erroneous portions of the transcript to find that Tun lacked
credibility, and focused on “minutia in the effort to find
inconsistencies” in Tun’s testimony.174 Together, the court found

167

Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1028-29.
169
Id. at 1027.
170
Id. at 1028.
171
Id. at 1026.
172
Id. at 1027.
173
Id. at 1029-30.
174
Id. at 1030. The court noted that “we can have no confidence that the
answers relayed by the interpreter to the IJ and the attorneys accurately reflected
what [Tun] answered.” Id.
168
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these errors added to the “overall prejudice” against Tun.175
Accordingly, the court remanded the case with specific
instructions to the IJ to ensure adequate translation and to
consider specific evidence submitted by Tun.176
Tun v. Gonzales represents the substantive effects of a
biased judge in immigration proceedings. As the court noted,
the immigration judge’s combined errors were “sufficiently
pervasive that we must conclude they may have had an effect
on the outcome” of the case.177 Unlike other IJs reprimanded by
circuit courts, the immigration judge in Tun did not vocalize
her bias by yelling or speaking in an improper manner.178
Rather, the IJ’s bias against Tun took a more subtle form,
exemplified by her refusal to consider the adequacy of the
translation services provided to Tun during his hearing.
The IJ was certainly alerted to the translation problem.
But even with knowledge of potentially erroneous translation
occurring in her courtroom, the IJ took no action to ensure the
reliability of Tun’s translated testimony. Without the presence
of a native Burmese speaker in the courtroom, Tun may never
have known his words were not being properly conveyed to the
judge. Although Tun successfully convinced the Eighth Circuit
that the translation problem affected the outcome of his case, a
more disturbing question remains: why would an IJ fail to
ensure an applicant’s testimony is being properly translated?
Surely immigration judges are aware that federal law
requires proper translation in immigration hearings.179 Thus,
the problem was not the result of the IJ’s lack of knowledge.
Rather, the IJ’s refusal to ensure adequate translation services
to Tun suggests the presence of bias against an asylum
applicant. Essentially, the IJ’s actions indicated to Tun that his
own words were irrelevant; if she was not going to consider his
testimony anyway, why bother to translate his words
accurately? In this way, the IJ’s bias impacted her decision-

175

Tun, 485 F.3d at 1030.
Id. at 1031.
177
Id.
178
Immigration judges have been reprimanded for yelling at litigants, using
sarcastic language, and otherwise displaying blatantly inappropriate behavior on the
bench. See, e.g., Elias v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 444, 452 (6th Cir. 2007); Wang v. Attorney
Gen. of the U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 269 (3d Cir. 2005).
179
Federal law requires that interpreters in a hearing before an IJ be “sworn
to interpret and translate accurately.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.5 (2007). However, interpreters
in immigration courtrooms are “of mixed ability.” Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11,
at 383.
176
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making process and had a significant negative effect on Tun’s
case. Despite the difficulties inherent in identifying this type of
unethical conduct, this case represents the importance of
eliminating bias from the immigration bench.
2. The Incompetent Immigration Judge: Tadesse v.
Gonzales
In addition to biased conduct, judicial incompetence in
immigration courts is raising increased concerns in the circuit
courts. In July 2007, the Seventh Circuit reprimanded the
incompetent conduct of an immigration judge in Tadesse v.
Gonzales.180 Ejigu Tadesse was an Ethiopian citizen of half
Eritrean descent.181 After a cease-fire was declared ending the
war between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Tadesse tried to travel to
Ethiopia to learn what had happened to her immediate
family.182 She was detained at the airport by Ethiopian
policemen, who accused her of being an Eritrean spy due to her
ethnic heritage. Tadesse claimed the policemen severely beat
her and that two of the officers raped her. They then ordered
her to leave the country.183 Tadesse sought medical treatment
and stayed with a family friend for two months before leaving
Ethiopia. She eventually arrived in the United States and
sought asylum.
The immigration judge denied Tadesse’s application for
asylum, holding that she included fraudulent documents in her
application for asylum and finding Tadesse’s testimony
“implausible and inconsistent.”184 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s
decision and Tadesse sought relief in the circuit courts.
The IJ first concluded that Tadesse submitted
fraudulent documents as part of her asylum application.
During the merits hearing, the government submitted a report
concluding that Tadesse’s Ethiopian deportation order was
fraudulent.185 Tadesse objected on the grounds that she had not
been given an opportunity to study the report in advance of the
hearing.186 The IJ did not give Tadesse an opportunity to review
180

492 F.3d 905, 912 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 906.
182
Id.
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id. at 907. Ms. Tadesse was represented before the IJ by attorney Nancy
Vizer, who provided additional insight into this case.
181

498

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:2

the report, but promised to allow Tadesse to present her own
expert in rebuttal.187
At the next hearing, Tadesse offered an affidavit and
expert testimony of an “eminent scholar” of Ethiopian politics
and culture who had written extensively about Ethiopia.188
However, the IJ refused to accept the expert’s affidavit or
testimony because he was not “an expert as to the issuance of
documents.”189 In the first of a series of rebukes to the
immigration judge, the appellate court held the IJ’s rejection of
this evidence was “arbitrary” and “prejudicial,” because the
expert testimony was “directly on point [to the authenticity of
the deportation order] and went to the very heart of Tadesse’s
claim.”190
The IJ also discounted the evidence offered by Tadesse
in the affidavit of her torture counselor, reasoning that
“although [the counselor] is a ‘therapist’ she is not a
psychologist or psychiatrist.”191 However, the counselor’s
affidavit noted that she held a master’s degree in psychology
and expected to receive her Ph.D. in clinical psychology nine
months prior to the IJ’s date of decision. Thus, the “IJ’s
comment was therefore incorrect as well as inappropriate.”192
Regarding Tadesse’s post-torture symptoms, the IJ’s opinion
came to a conclusion that was “completely at odds with [the
counselor’s] affidavit.”193 Such discrepancies led the Seventh
Circuit to conclude that the IJ had not properly reviewed the
evidence, for the “IJ could not have carefully reviewed [the
counselor’s] findings and reached this conclusion.”194 The
appellate court’s frustration with the IJ’s inadequate judicial
performance was quite evident: the court complained that
“[t]his portion of the opinion, like so much else, is not
supported by cogent reasons and cannot stand.”195
Although the IJ further concluded that portions of
Tadesse’s testimony related to her return to Ethiopia and her
choice to seek asylum were “implausible,” the court reprimanded the IJ for such conclusions, which were “unsupported
187
188
189
190
191
192
193
194
195

Tadesse, 492 F.3d at 907.
Id. at 908.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 911.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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by substantial evidence.”196 The court ultimately determined
the IJ’s opinion was “riddled with systematic and obvious
errors.”197 As a result of the IJ’s erroneous opinion, the court
found that Tadesse did not receive a fair hearing in
immigration court and therefore granted Tadesse’s petition for
review and remanded her case.198
The IJ hearing Tadesse’s claim acted incompetently in
several ways. First, her failure to allow Tadesse to offer expert
evidence in rebuttal was legally improper, since “an IJ may
not bar whole chunks of material evidence favorable to
[Tadesse].”199 At a minimum judicial competence requires “legal
knowledge.”200 By failing to properly follow the law permitting
an applicant to present evidence on her own behalf, the IJ
displayed a lack of “legal knowledge” necessary to properly
decide this case.
Second, the IJ’s obvious failure to carefully review an
affidavit submitted by Tadesse is disturbing. Although judicial
competence requires “thoroughness” and “preparation,”201 the IJ
deciding Tadesse’s case did not adjudicate the case in a
thorough manner. Moreover, if immigration judges are not
reviewing evidence put forth by applicants, the competency and
integrity of the entire hearing is undermined.
Not surprisingly, given that the IJ did not properly
consider Tadesse’s written evidence, the IJ also inexplicably
refused to believe portions of Tadesse’s testimony. Certainly it
is within the discretion of an immigration judge to determine
whether an applicant is lying, but the circuit court found that
this IJ’s credibility determinations were unsupported by
substantial evidence—that is, she had no logical reason to
believe Tadesse was lying.
These issues point to a larger and inescapable ethical
conclusion: the immigration judge was either legally
incompetent, or was actively biased against Tadesse. Either of
these possibilities is contrary to the American concept of
justice. Even in the face of limited resources and time
constraints, a “neutral” arbiter should follow the rules of
196

Id. at 910.
Id. at 912.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 909; see also Boyanivskyy v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 286, 294 (7th Cir.
2006) (finding IJ’s exclusion of asylum applicant’s corroboration witnesses to be
prejudicial error); Zolotukhin v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 1073, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005) (same).
200
ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.5, cmt. [1].
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Id.
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evidence and should be reasonably prepared for a hearing.
Without the assurance of unbiased and competent behavior on
the bench, the immigration system cannot reasonably promise
litigants they will receive a fair hearing. In this way, active
bias or legal incompetence on the part of immigration judges
skews the system itself; if an immigrant’s claim is ultimately
decided through an unfair proceeding, the reliability of the
entire adjudicatory process is threatened. In light of these farreaching consequences, evidence showing judicial bias and
incompetence raises the next question: what are the causes of
unethical conduct on the immigration bench?
IV.

CAUSES AND PENDING SOLUTIONS

A.

Causes of Unethical Conduct

Several potential causes of unethical behavior on the
part of immigration judges emerge through analysis of recent
cases. One reason, discussed in Part III.C, supra, is the difficult
and unique nature of immigration cases. Another contributing
factor—analyzed often by scholars and practitioners—is the
lack of time and resources available to immigration judges.202
Immigration judges are certainly overworked; in 2006,
the nation’s 215 immigration judges completed a total of
365,851 cases.203 Each judge must therefore adjudicate 1,700
cases a year, or nearly seven cases each business day, to stay
current with her docket.204 Although Second Circuit Chief
Judge Walker urged Congress to double the existing number of
immigration judges, Congress has yet to do so.205
Without the ability to take time to consider each case,
immigration judges are bound to make mistakes—often serious
mistakes with critical implications for the immigrants
appearing before them.206 A judge without the time or resources
202
Alexander, supra note 8, at 19-20; Melloy, supra note 119, at 666-67;
Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 383.
203
2006 YEARBOOK, supra note 68, at B2; Alexander, supra note 8, at 19.
204
The former President of the National Association of Immigration Judges,
Denise Slavin, reported in 2005 that she had 1,000 cases on her docket at one time.
Liptak, supra note 8; see also Alexander, supra note 8, at 19-20. Immigration judges in
busy districts must manage disproportionately larger caseloads; “while the average
immigration judge hears four cases a day, immigration judges on the Texas border hear
at least ten.” Melloy, supra note 119, at 666.
205
Walker Statement, supra note 73.
206
See Alexander, supra note 8, at 19 (noting that IJs “simply do not have
enough time to do their jobs well”).
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to adequately review changes in the law, or to properly
consider fact-intensive cases, may slip into a pattern of errors.
In this way, an overworked judge can quickly become an
incompetent judge.207 For example, Tadesse’s IJ may have
failed to adequately read Tadesse’s affidavit due to time
constraints; Tadesse’s case was likely only one of many merits
hearings heard by the IJ that day. Also, an immigration judge
feeling pressure to complete a large caseload may lose the
ability to recognize where personal bias enters the decisionmaking process.
However, even if the reasons for bias or incompetence
on the part of immigration judges can be understood in the
context of difficult cases and understaffed courts, such behavior
violates the norms of judicial ethics. Judicial neutrality and
competence must be prioritized over expedient resolution of
cases. As the Seventh Circuit noted in 2004, litigants seeking
to remain in the United States “should not bear the entire
burden of adjudicative inadequacy at the administrative
level.”208 Fortunately, the government now recognizes the
importance of ensuring ethical conduct in immigration courts.
B.

The Response of Attorney General Gonzales: The EOIR
Codes of Conduct

The growing cry for reform—from immigration
practitioners, circuit court judges, and immigration judges
themselves209—finally reached the ears of Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales. In January 2006, Gonzales announced that
he received reports of conduct on the part of immigration
judges which “can aptly be described as intemperate or even

207

Immigration judges are under extreme pressure to complete cases
expeditiously, to the point where some Assistant Chief Immigration Judges actually
visit IJs in person to encourage them to move cases more quickly. Marks Interview,
supra note 66. In this type of environment, judges are “less inclined to sit and listen to
a case, or to give it the time it needs.” Former IJ Interview, supra note 28.
208
Guchshenkov v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 554, 560 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e have
never heard it argued that busy judges should be excused from having to deliver
reasoned judgments because they are too busy to think.”); see also Iao v. Gonzales, 400
F.3d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[W]e are not authorized to affirm unreasoned decisions
even when we understand why they are unreasoned.”).
209
See generally Liptak, supra note 8.
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abusive.”210 Following a “comprehensive review,” Gonzales
proposed a set of reforms in August 2006.211
These “key reforms” included performance evaluations
for immigration judges, an immigration law exam, sanctioning
powers allowing immigration judges to sanction litigants and
counsel for “false statements, frivolous behavior, and other
gross misconduct,”212 increased resources, and technological
improvements.213 On the issue of judicial ethics, Gonzales
promised to draft a new code of conduct for immigration judges
and BIA members, impose “mechanisms to detect poor conduct
and quality by immigration judges and Board members,” and
improve complaint procedures for inappropriate conduct by
adjudicators.214
Gonzales’s reform measures were initially hailed as a
large step in the right direction.215 However, it soon became
apparent that implementation of these reforms would not be an
expedited or simple task. More than a year after Attorney
General promised reforms, immigration judges had not seen
any “changes on the ground.”216
It took nearly a year after the reforms were announced
for EOIR to release the promised “Codes of Conduct of the
Immigration Judges and Board Members” (“EOIR Codes”).217
210
Memorandum from Attorney General Alberto Gonzales to Immigration
Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-agmemo-ijs.pdf.
211
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales
Outlines Reforms for Immigration Courts and Board of Immigration Appeals (Aug. 9,
2006) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2006/
August/06_ag_520.html.
212
Allowing IJs to sanction litigants could enable these judges to control
potentially unethical behavior on the part of immigration lawyers in their courtrooms.
However, given the persistence of unethical behavior on the part of IJs themselves, this
particular reform idea will not remedy the ethical crisis on the bench.
213
Id.
214
Id.
215
Melloy, supra note 119, at 667 n.228.
216
Pamela A. Maclean, Mixed Signals from the DOJ Immigration Bench
Reforms: Implemented, or Not?, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 16, 2007, at 1; see also NAIJ Letter,
supra note 113. (“[As of February 2008], there has been no implementation [of] what
we consider to be the two key measures [in Attorney General Gonzales’s reform
proposal] to improve the Immigration Court system. Indeed, we have lost ground.”
(endnote omitted)).
217
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Codes of Conduct for Immigration Judges and Board
Members, 72 Fed. Reg. 35,510 (proposed June 28, 2007) [hereinafter EOIR CODES]. The
Codes were released for public comment from June 28, 2007 to July 30, 2007; final
publication is pending. There is a separate set of codes for IJs and for members of the
BIA, but their provisions are substantially similar and the references herein generally
apply to both.
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The EOIR Codes, proposed in June 2007, are intended to
supplement the personnel disciplinary rules, ethics rules, and
management policies of EOIR and the DOJ, and are designed
to “preserve the integrity and professionalism of the
immigration court system” and the BIA.218 EOIR has not
announced when the Codes are expected to be published in
final form and the process of editing the Codes is “internal” to
the DOJ. 219
The proposed EOIR Codes are similar to those already
in place for other judges. For example, like the recently revised
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the EOIR Codes require
IJs/BIA members to avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.220 The Codes require an IJ/BIA member to comply
with the codes of professional responsibility where the IJ/BIA
member is a member of the bar, as well as the state in which
the IJ/BIA member performs his/her duties.221 This rule could
provide a significant basis for disciplinary procedures against
IJs or BIA members who fail to comply with ethical guidelines
as attorneys.
The EOIR Codes demonstrate a renewed emphasis on
professionalism for IJs and BIA members, perhaps acknowledging the effects of inappropriate judicial conduct on the
perceived integrity of the immigration structure. As the
Commentary to the EOIR Codes recognizes, “an immigration
judge who manifests bias or engages in unprofessional conduct
in any manner during a proceeding may impair the fairness of
the proceeding and may bring into question the impartiality of
the immigration court system.”222 The EOIR Codes require
immigration judges and BIA members to “act in a professional
manner toward the parties and their representatives before the
court, and toward others with whom the immigration judge
deals in an official capacity.”223 Like the ABA Code of Judicial
Conduct, the EOIR Codes also require that IJs/BIA members
act “impartially” and avoid any actions that “in the judgment of
a reasonable person, would create the appearance that he or

218

Id. pmbl. (capitalization removed).
Telephone Interview with official from EOIR Office of Legislative and
Public Affairs (Aug. 18, 2007).
220
EOIR CODES, supra note 217, pmbl.; ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93,
Rule 1.2.
221
EOIR CODES, supra note 217, Canon III.
222
Id. Commentary.
223
Id. Canon X.
219
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she is violating the law or applicable ethical standards.”224 IJs
and BIA members must therefore “refrain from any conduct,
including but not limited to financial and business dealings,
that tends to reflect adversely on impartiality, demeans the
judicial office, interferes with the proper performance of
judicial duties, or exploits the immigration judge’s official
position.”225
Furthermore, the EOIR Codes address the issue of bias
and incompetence in the courtroom. Like other types of judges,
immigration judges and BIA members must adhere to the law
and “maintain professional competence in it.”226 In addition to
this basic requirement of competence, EOIR now requires that
an immigration judge “shall be patient, dignified, and
courteous to litigants, witnesses, lawyers, and others with
whom the judge deals in his or her official capacity.”227
Although this point should be a matter of simple professional
courtesy, the behavior of the IJs hearing Tun’s and Tadesse’s
cases sadly demonstrates the necessity for this rule.
On the issue of bias, both immigration judges and BIA
members are informed they “shall not, in the performance of
official duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or
prejudice.”228 This critical provision is clearly a response to
concerns of biased and prejudiced behavior by IJs and BIA
members against litigants. The burden lies on the judges
themselves, who must be “alert to avoid behavior, to include
inappropriate demeanor, that may be perceived as
prejudicial.”229 While these statements should be heralded as
long overdue and promising developments for ethical
standards, they also highlight the limitations of such Codes of
Conduct.
The EOIR Codes fail to adequately address the unique
nature of immigration court. The Codes do not acknowledge the
language challenges, credibility issues, and fact-intensive
inquiries conducted by immigration judges. One immigration
judge, speaking off the record, noted that the Codes do not
provide any real guidance, since they do not contain anything
224

Id. Canons VI, VII.
Id. Canon XI.
226
Id. Canon V.
227
Id. Canon IX.
228
Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the limitations of this provision,
see infra Part IV.C.1.
229
Id. Commentary (emphasis added).
225
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“different from what all of us [should] try to do in the first
place.”230
Specific shortcomings undermine the ability of the EOIR
Codes to effectively remedy unethical conduct on the part of
immigration judges. For example, the Codes lack both
specificity and effective enforcement mechanisms. At this time,
neither existing ethical guidelines nor EOIR’s complaint
procedures are adequately protecting litigants from unethical
judicial behavior. Without a more effective method of
monitoring and enforcement, the newly created EOIR Codes of
Conduct are merely words on paper.
C.

Weakness in the EOIR Codes of Conduct
1. Lack of Specificity

Unlike the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the
current proposed EOIR Codes fail to define key terms
necessary for proper implementation. The most alarming
example is the EOIR Codes’ failure to define the terms “bias
and prejudice.” The drafters did provide an explanatory test to
determine whether an “appearance of impropriety” exists, but
offered no guidance on what types of behavior may “manifest
bias” or “impair [the proceeding’s] fairness.”231
In contrast, recognizing that “[a]n independent, fair and
impartial judiciary is indispensable to our system of justice,”232
Rule 2.3 of the 2007 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct
specifically addresses “Bias, Prejudice, and Harassment.”
Contrary to the EOIR Codes, the Model Code specifically
outlines prohibited behavior.233 For example, Rule 2.3(B), the
black letter portion of the Code, provides a judge shall not
manifest bias or prejudice, by words or conduct, on the basis of
230

Telephone Interview with anonymous IJ (July 31, 2007).
According to the EOIR Codes, the test to determine the appearance of
impropriety is “whether the conduct would create in the mind of a reasonable person
with knowledge of the relevant facts the belief that the immigration judge’s ability to
carry out adjudicatory responsibilities with integrity, impartiality, and competence is
impaired.” EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. The AILA agrees that the EOIR
Codes lack specific guidance. See Comments to Proposed Codes of Conduct for
Immigration Judges and BIA Members, July 30, 2007, available at
http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=23005. The National Association of
Immigration Judges also took the position that the Codes lack relevant guidance for
IJs and drafted a more thorough “Code of Conduct” for EOIR’s consideration, closely
based on the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Marks Interview, supra note 66.
232
ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, pmbl.
233
See, e.g., id. Rule 2.3.
231
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factors “including but not limited to” race, sex, gender, religion,
national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual orientation,
marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.234
Likewise, the Codes of Conduct for United States Judges
impose the responsibility to “avoid comment or behavior that
can reasonably be interpreted as manifesting prejudice or
bias…on the basis of personal characteristics like race, sex,
religion, or national origin.”235
Moreover, the Comment to ABA Model Rule 2.3 is even
more helpful. Comment 2 to Rule 2.3 presents “examples of
manifestation of bias or prejudice,” including but not limited to
“epithets; slurs; demeaning nicknames; negative stereotyping;
attempted humor based upon stereotypes; threatening,
intimidating, or hostile acts; suggestions of connections
between race, ethnicity, or nationality and crime; and
irrelevant references to personal characteristics.”236 In addition,
the Comment notes that “[e]ven facial expressions and body
language can convey to parties and lawyers in the proceeding,
jurors, the media, and others an appearance of bias and
prejudice.”237 Accordingly, the Model Code requires that a judge
“must avoid conduct that may reasonably be perceived as
prejudiced or biased.”238
The specific examples were added to the 2007 Model
Code after witnesses urged the ABA Commission to provide
illustrations of bias, and “to better inform judges of what bias
entails and what some of the most common bias-related
problems are.”239 By enumerating factors and offering examples
of biased behavior, these codes of conduct provide greater
guidance for judges to “check themselves” for hidden bias or
prejudice in the courtroom.
Based on the recently reported behavior of immigration
judges, the ABA “examples of manifestation of bias and
prejudice” are common occurrences in immigration courts.240
Yet the EOIR Codes of Conduct fail to list even one factor or
example of manifested bias or prejudice. This simple omission

234

ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.3(B).
Id. Rule 2.3, cmt. 2.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges would benefit from
similar enumerated examples.
240
See supra note 149.
235
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has broad ramifications, for every individual has a different
view of what the term “bias” can entail.
Similarly, the EOIR Codes order immigration judges
and BIA members to “maintain professional competence” in the
law.241 However, the EOIR Codes fail to specifically define the
term “competence” for immigration judges. As noted above, the
ABA defines judicial competence as requiring “the legal
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary to perform a judge’s responsibilities of judicial
office.”242 As an aspirational set of rules, the ABA definition
could easily be applied to immigration judges and BIA
members.
But competence might have a broader meaning for
immigration judges and BIA members, who must stay abreast
of the constantly changing world of immigration law and face
unique challenges in their daily work. Certainly, knowledge
and skills in immigration law are absolutely necessary for
immigration judges; in response to reports of judicial
incompetence, the Attorney General is implementing
“immigration law exams” for judges appointed after December
2006.243 But the Attorney General also will require
“performance evaluations” of immigration judges, which will
include an assessment as to whether new appointees “possess
the appropriate judicial temperament . . . for the job.”244 This
assessment suggests that “temperament” is a significant
component of competence in the Attorney General’s view.
Given these developments, EOIR should utilize its
proposed Codes of Conduct as an opportunity to expand upon
the ABA definition of judicial competence. For example, judicial
competence should include the concept of “proper judicial
temperament,” in addition to knowledge of applicable law and
preparation for individual cases. The term “competence” could
also be clarified by requiring all immigration judges to pass a
substantive immigration law exam annually as part of formal
training; such a requirement would send a clear signal to
immigration judges that judicial competence requires more
than merely expediting completion of cases. In short, the terms
241

EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Canon V.
ABA JUDICIAL CODE, supra note 93, Rule 2.5, cmt. [1].
243
DOJ Press Release, supra note 211. Because the exams will apply only to
judges appointed after December 31, 2006, existing judges are apparently exempt from
the immigration law exam. Id.
244
Id.
242
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“bias” and “competence” must be more clearly defined,
particularly in an ethical scheme asking judges to regulate
their own behavior.
2. Lack of Enforcement Mechanism
The efficacy of the EOIR Codes of Conduct is further
limited by its reliance on self-regulation of ethical conduct.
How can an immigration judge or BIA member, who may have
years of ingrained frustrations resulting in biases against
litigants in immigration courts, “be alert to avoid” her own
behavior or accustomed demeanor?245 In light of the egregious
behaviors outlined in the cases and statistics above, an ethical
scheme relying on judges to identify their own incompetence, or
minimize their own biases, is problematic.246 Thus, another
limitation of the EOIR Codes, and arguably the most
damaging, is the lack of an effective external enforcement
mechanism.
Theoretically, the EOIR Codes may be enforced by the
current procedure for complaints of misconduct, for the Codes
provide that any disciplinary action must come from within the
Department of Justice. The Commentary states, “This Code
does not create any rights or interests for any party outside of
the Department of Justice, nor may violations furnish the basis
for civil liability, injunctive relief or criminal prosecution.”247
This provision ostensibly places responsibility on the DOJ,
rather than third parties, to monitor and enforce the Codes.248
However, such a structure will likely be ineffective, for the
DOJ’s current disciplinary structure for IJs suffers from
several weaknesses.

245

EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary.
See generally Randy Lee, The State of Self-Regulation of the Legal
Profession: Have We Locked the Fox in the Chicken Coop?, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 69
(2002).
247
EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary.
248
The EOIR Codes Commentary indicates that “[v]iolations of these canons
may serve as the basis for disciplinary action, but may not be used in any other
proceeding, and may not be used to challenge the rulings of an Immigration Judge.”
EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Commentary. The EOIR Codes should instead provide an
“extra layer” of oversight to prohibit conduct that might not affect the substantive
outcome of the proceeding, but is nonetheless inappropriate and detrimental to the
integrity of the immigration system.
246
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a. Current Disciplinary Procedures Are
Inadequate to Ensure Compliance
with Ethical Codes
The current disciplinary structure for immigration
judges does not adequately enforce ethical conduct on the
bench. On its face, the disciplinary process is limited by the
lack of external review. Complaints of misconduct are directed
to the Assistant Chief Immigration Judge who holds
supervisory authority over the judge in question.249 Unless
referral to the Office of Professional Responsibility is deemed
warranted,250 the complaint stays with the ACIJ; while the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge and the EOIR Director
are made aware of the complaint, it is the ACIJ who is
responsible for handling the complaint.
If the supervisor determines the complaint lacks merit,
the process ends there. Unfortunately, as members of the
immigration court system, ACIJs suffer from the same working
pressures as IJs. Moreover, if the ACIJ has a strong working
relationship or is friendly with the IJ, the ACIJ may be less
likely to take disciplinary action. The individual filing a
complaint has no method of appeal, meaning the determination
of the ACIJ can effectively end the complaint process. The
OCIJ does not disclose whether action, if any, is taken against
an employee in response to a complaint.251
EOIR’s complaint process has been criticized as murky
and bureaucratic by immigration experts outside of EOIR.
Immigration practitioners complain about the “uncertainty as
to what actions OCIJ takes on such complaints” as well as
“what types of complaints are likely to be of concern to OCIJ.”252
As a result, some practitioners believe that it does “no good to
complain because nothing ever happens.”253 The issues of
underreporting and the determination of whether immigrants
and practitioners are discouraged from filing complaints
against IJs are worthy of further study.
Concern also exists that the disciplinary procedure for
immigration judges is used for political purposes, rather than
249

See supra Part II.D.
See discussion supra note 85.
251
EOIR/AILA Liaison Meeting Agenda Questions, March 7, 2002, Question
4, Response, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/eoiraila0203.htm.
252
Id. Question 4.
253
Id.
250
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used to remedy actual misconduct. EOIR holds the power to
“reassign” immigration judges to different job titles or job
duties as a “matter of management discretion.”254 Reassignment
in such cases is not deemed “disciplinary in nature if there is
no loss of pay or grade”—even if a judge is removed from the
bench.255 Similarly, the Attorney General may also reassign or
remove immigration judges at any time.256 Given recent
examples of political removals, such as Ashcroft’s removal of
BIA members who were more likely to favor immigrants,
immigration judges are left with an “emerging fear that ruling
against the government in a deportation case can be hazardous
to one’s job.”257
The Attorney General recently attempted to implement
another layer of ethical review with the creation of a new
position: Assistant Chief Immigration Judge for Conduct and
Professionalism.258 As noted, the person holding this position is
essentially an ACIJ serving an advisory role in issues of
ethics.259 The implementation of a position focused on conduct
and professionalism could represent a promising step in the
area of ethical monitoring, as it indicates EOIR’s renewed
dedication to ensuring ethical behavior on the part of
immigration judges. However, because the ACIJ for Conduct
and Professionalism appears to be merely an advisory
position,260 ethical monitoring in EOIR would benefit from the
implementation of a multi-member panel (in the form of the
254

Legomsky, supra note 52, at 373.
Id. at 373-74.
256
Id.
257
Id. For this reason, many IJs, scholars, and advocates are calling for the
removal of the immigration courts from the Department of Justice. See Legomsky,
supra note 52, at 373 n.14 (citing Nat’l Ass’n of Immigration Judges unpublished
position paper calling for an independent immigration court), 404 (“In view of the
events of 2002 and 2003, the adjudicators can never again feel confident that they can
safely rule against the Department . . . .”); see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11,
at 386-87 (proposing independence for immigration courts from the Department of
Justice).
258
AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 2-3. Notably, there is no
description of this position on EOIR’s website.
259
See supra note 82.
260
AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 3; see also discussion supra
note 82. The author attempted to clarify the role of the ACIJ for Conduct and
Professionalism in a telephone interview with an official from EOIR Office of
Legislative and Public Affairs. EOIR Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra
note 219. The official confirmed the existence of the ACIJ for Conduct and
Professionalism, which is listed on EOIR’s website and referenced in the April 11
AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda notes, but refused to elaborate on the actual role or duties
of this ACIJ because the position is “new.” Id.
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Ethics Review Board discussed in Part V.C and D, infra) to
actually handle the complaints.
The current disciplinary structure is therefore
unsatisfactory on several levels. Because it lacks both
transparency and methods for appeal, the structure is not
sufficient to monitor ethical behavior on the part of IJs.
Immigration judges working in fear of losing their jobs if they
rule against the government will be less inclined to focus on
ethics, and more inclined to focus on job security. Several
additional reforms are necessary to monitor and ensure ethical
judicial behavior in immigration courts.
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The crisis on the American immigration bench is
evidenced by appellate court opinions condemning the conduct
of immigration judges, studies demonstrating statistical
inconsistencies in immigration decisions, and recurring stories
of injustice reported by individual litigants.261 From an ethical
perspective, this crisis has serious repercussions. In particular,
biased and incompetent conduct on the part of immigration
judges negatively impacts the lives of individuals seeking to
remain in the United States. A larger issue is also at hand:
without significant ethical reforms to ensure proper judicial
conduct, the entire system of immigration adjudication is
flawed.
Together with circuit court judges, immigration judges
are calling for increased resources to assist with their heavy
workload.262 Legal scholars have also recommended specific
changes designed to improve the structure of the immigration
court system. For example, Sydenham Alexander suggested a
campaign to publicly identify the “worst” IJs in order to remove
them from the bench.263 Alexander’s campaign hopes to “change
substantially the system that those judges will leave behind.”264
In addition, Professors Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and
Schrag presented numerous recommendations focused on
structural change. These suggestions included (1) bringing
immigration adjudicators together to discuss the vast
inconsistencies in asylum outcomes, (2) increased training for
261
262
263
264

See sources cited supra notes 8, 11, 149.
See Maclean, supra note 216.
Alexander, supra note 8, at 45-46.
Id. at 46.
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immigration judges with a focus on judicial temperament, (3)
more rigorous hiring standards for EOIR, (4) more resources
for immigration courts, including an increase in the number of
immigration judges, and (5) appointed counsel provided by the
government for any indigent asylum applicant litigating in
immigration court.265 Each of these ideas has merit, and this
author supports these scholars in calling for structural reform.
Recognizing the urgency, Attorney General Gonzales
promised reforms to address judicial misconduct in immigration courts. Many of the Attorney General’s initiatives are
“internal,”266 and it is possible that significant changes are
being implemented without publicity. Observers should closely
watch EOIR and the DOJ to guarantee completion of these
improvements.
However, even if these changes are successfully
implemented, additional reforms will remain necessary to
resolve the crisis on the immigration bench. Because the
focus of this article is judicial ethics, the reforms proposed
herein are intended to specifically diminish judicial bias and
incompetence. First, EOIR should recognize the ethical duty of
overworked immigration judges to refrain from taking on new
cases. In addition, EOIR should improve ethics training and
create an Ethics Review Board to work in conjunction with the
structural reforms discussed above. All three proposals would
be cost effective and fairly simple to implement, in hopes that
Justice Department officials will use them to continue
reorganizing the structure of EOIR.267
A.

Ethical Obligation to Avoid Case Overloads

The EOIR Codes of Conduct could serve as a means of
support for immigration judges whose competence on the bench
is negatively impacted by excessive workloads. The ABA
recently declared that lawyers representing indigent criminal
cases have an ethical obligation to refuse accepting new clients
if an excessive caseload “prevents a lawyer from providing

265

Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 380-89.
EOIR Office of Legislative and Public Affairs, supra note 219; see also
Authorities Delegated to the Director, supra note 38, 72 Fed. Reg. at 53,674 (stating
that the Attorney General’s directives “are being implemented through internal
management changes within EOIR”).
267
Some of these reform suggestions were submitted to the DOJ as public
comments for the proposed Codes of Conduct on July 27, 2007.
266

2008]

CRISIS ON THE IMMIGRATION BENCH

513

competent and diligent representation to existing clients.”268
Admittedly, this ABA Code provision is intended to apply to
lawyers in advocacy positions, a role very different from the job
of a neutral arbiter. However, the EOIR Codes of Conduct
indicated EOIR’s intent to hold immigration judges accountable
under the same standards of conduct as all attorneys in their
state of license or in the state in which they sit on the bench,
despite the fact that immigration judges and attorneys serve
very different roles in the adversarial system.269
If immigration judges are to be held to the same
standards of conduct as attorneys, the EOIR Codes of Conduct
should draw an analogy from the ABA rules: the EOIR Codes
should provide that an overworked immigration judge without
the time or resources necessary to decide cases in a thorough
and competent manner has an ethical obligation to avoid
taking on new cases.
This provision would certainly be controversial in light
of political and practical pressure to decide immigration cases
expediently. Indeed, such action might require organization on
the part of immigration judges themselves, much like public
defenders going on strike to highlight their lack of resources.270
If immigration judges refused to take more cases than they
could fairly and adequately handle, their action would have two
immediate effects: it would signal to the federal government
that the problem of inadequate judicial resources is closely
aligned with judicial competence, and it would empower
immigration judges to publicly value ethical decision-making.271
In this way, the proposed EOIR Codes of Conduct could
potentially serve as catalysts inspiring further ethical reform.

268

ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006);
see also ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 2 (2002) (“A lawyer’s
workload must be controlled so that each matter can be handled competently.”).
269
EOIR CODES, supra note 217, Canon III.
270
See Brandon Buskey, When Public Defenders Strike: Exploring How Public
Defenders Can Utilize the Lessons of Public Choice Theory to Become Effective Political
Actors, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 533 (2007), available at http://www.hlrponline.com/
vol1no2/buskey.pdf.
271
The potential effectiveness of this reform strategy is worthy of further
consideration. Note that IJs employing this technique would need to ensure their
actions are interpreted as a justified cry for reform, rather than as an outright
rebellion jeopardizing their job security.
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Improved Ethics Training

As it revises its code of conduct, EOIR must clarify the
applicable ethical rules for immigration judges. It is simply
unrealistic to expect an overworked group of judges to
continuously follow changes in multiple sets of rules and
guidelines. Strictly defining applicable ethical rules will enable
judges to follow a clearer standard of conduct.
This unified standard should be enhanced by improving
training for immigration judges and BIA members on ethicsrelated issues. Budgetary concerns have limited training
conferences in recent years, including 2008,272 but the crisis in
immigration courts demonstrates a renewed need for formal
ethics training.
At a minimum, immigration judges are currently
required to attend one hour of training per year on ethics
issues.273 EOIR recognized the need for additional training for
immigration judges, and indicated its intent to provide
“extended training” for immigration judges on “substantive
legal issues” and “professionalism.”274 The EOIR Director’s
job responsibilities now include providing “comprehensive,
continuing training” for immigration judges to “promote the
quality and consistency of adjudications.”275
Assuming that a more specific version of the Codes of
Conduct is in place, immigration judges should be trained to
appreciate the importance of each of these codes. In addition to
the training on judicial temperament suggested by Professors
Ramji-Nogales, Schoenholtz, and Schrag,276 IJs should be
reminded that neutrality, competence, and general adherence
to judicial ethics rules are critical parts of their jobs on the
bench.
272
See discussion supra notes 112, 113. Immigration judges were “shocked
and disappointed” to learn that the 2008 training had been cancelled and warned that
“the results of this [cancellation], without some accommodations, would be disastrous.”
NAIJ Letter, supra note 113.
273
5 C.F.R. § 2638.704 (2007).
274
AILA-EOIR Liaison Agenda, supra note 82, at 2.
275
Authorities Delegated to the Director, supra note 38, at 53,677 (codified at
8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(b)(1)(vii) (2007)). Notably, the cancellation of the 2008 training
conference for immigration judges “is in direct contravention to the measure of
improved training announced by the Attorney General.” NAIJ Letter, supra note 113.
276
See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 11, at 382 (recommending training for
IJs to include “counseling on impartiality, avoiding stereotyping, and not taking
personally the misconduct that the judges sometimes encounter from people who are
desperate to remain in the United States”).
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Training need not only occur on the national level. Local
offices should offer seminars on judicial ethics, much like
continuing legal education training for practicing attorneys. In
addition to the value for individual judges, the DOJ would gain
valuable public relations benefits. In short, the implementation
of improved formal ethics trainings would be a low-cost, but
highly advantageous, reform for immigration judges.
C.

Creation of an EOIR Ethics Review Board

In 2006, as part of his ongoing structural reforms in
immigration courts, the Attorney General announced he would
address the failings of the IJ disciplinary process by implementing “improved complaint procedures for inappropriate
conduct by adjudicators.”277 To adequately repair this process,
the Attorney General should create an “Ethics Review Board”
(“ERB”) to supervise the courtroom conduct of immigration
judges. Using the clarified EOIR Codes of Conduct as a
governing standard, the Ethics Review Board could hear
complaints of inappropriate behavior brought by litigants,
practitioners, circuit court judges, or members of the public.
The ERB could then act to discipline judges for unethical
behavior, with the understanding that a behavioral complaint
will not impact the substantive outcome of an immigration
judge’s decision.278
D.

Structure of the Ethics Review Board

The ERB structure would consist of a panel of
reviewers, with a system for appeals if either party disagrees
with the ERB determination. The ERB structure would also
provide for public accountability in the form of public reports.
Useful analogies for this structure can be found in the process
for adjudicating disciplinary complaints against federal judges
and California state judges.

277
DOJ Press Release, supra note 211. The Attorney General delegated this
duty to the EOIR Director. See Authorities Delegated to Director, supra note 38, at
53,677 (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. Part 1003.0 (b)(viii)).
278
The proper avenue for review of inappropriate behavior that substantially
affects the outcome of the case is a legal appeal to the circuit courts. The ERB focus
will be inappropriate judicial conduct unrelated to an applicant’s substantive claim.
Similarly, the disciplinary structure for federal judges provides for dismissal if a
complaint is “directly related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 352 (b)(1)(A)(ii) (2006).
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Federal judges, state judges and administrative law
judges differ from immigration judges in notable ways,
including the procedural differences in the appointment
processes as discussed in Part II.B, supra. In addition, unlike
judges working within the Judicial Branch, immigration judges
operate under the Executive Branch of government. Despite
these differences, federal judges, state judges, administrative
law judges, and immigration judges all assume the role of a
“neutral arbiter” in adjudicatory proceedings. Thus, specific
elements of the federal and state judicial disciplinary structure
could serve as effective models for the disciplinary structure for
immigration judges.279
1. Analogy: Disciplinary Structure for the Federal
Judiciary
Federal judges must comply with the Code of Conduct
for United States judges. The ethical standards embodied in
the Code, which are intended to have a “preventive” effect, offer
affirmative guidelines for appropriate judicial behavior.280
Although the drafters of the Code did not intend that
disciplinary action would be appropriate for every violation of
the Code’s provisions, this Code “may provide standards of
conduct for application” in disciplinary proceedings against
federal judges.281
The procedure to file complaints against federal judges
for misconduct is governed by the “Judicial Councils Reform
and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act.”282 Elements of this
procedure serve as excellent models for a similar system for
279
An administrative law judge may be disciplined by his or her employing
agency only for “good cause.” 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (1989). To discipline an ALJ, the
employing agency must initiate formal proceedings with an independent agency, the
Merit Systems Protections Board. Id.
280
In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.3d 320, 322 (9th Cir. 1995).
281
CODE FOR U.S. JUDGES, supra note 108, Canon 1, Commentary. The
standard for disciplinary procedures under the Act is whether a judge’s conduct was
“prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
courts,” or whether a “federal judge is unable to discharge all the duties of office by
reason of a mental or physical disability.” 28 U.S.C. § 351(a) (2007). This disciplinary
structure could be strengthened by specifically including violations of the Codes of
Conduct for United States Judges as a basis for discipline. However, extended analysis
of the disciplinary structure for the federal judiciary is beyond the scope of this article.
282
TERRY EASTLAND ET AL., ETHICS IN THE COURTS: POLICING BEHAVIOR IN
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 1 (National Legal Center for the Public Interest) (1990). Nine
years later, Congress enacted the “Ethics Reform Act,” which regulates the
extrajudicial conduct of judges. Id. The Act is now codified in Title 28 of the United
States Code.
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immigration judges, particularly regarding the methods of
appeal for persons filing complaints and multi-member panels
of reviewers addressing complaints.
Under the Act, a person wishing to bring a charge
against a federal judge under this standard may file a
complaint with the clerk of the court of appeals, who then
reports the complaint to the chief judge of the circuit.283 The
initial responsibility to investigate complaints lies with the
chief judge, who must review all complaints and may conduct a
“limited inquiry.”284 After reviewing the complaint, the chief
judge may dismiss the complaint, resolve it informally, or
appoint a special committee to investigate the allegations.285
This procedure is similar to the current disciplinary
procedure for immigration judges, in which an ACIJ with
supervisory authority reviews and acts upon allegations of
misconduct. Unlike the current IJ procedure, however, the
disciplinary inquiry for federal judges does not end with a
single individual’s determination. Rather, if either party
disagrees with the chief judge’s resolution of a complaint,
review is available to the Judicial Council of the circuit.
The Judicial Council may then act in a number of ways,
including ordering additional investigation, dismissing the
complaint, ordering that no new cases be assigned to the
misbehaving judge, and censuring or reprimanding the judge
either publicly or privately.286 A party disagreeing with the
action taken by the Judicial Council has yet another layer of
appeal, for any party may petition the Judicial Conference of
the United States to hear the case.287 In addition, members of
the Judicial Council may themselves refer a complaint to the

283
28 U.S.C. § 351 (2000). This provision applies to circuit judges, district
judges, bankruptcy judges, and magistrate judges. Id. § 351(d). Congress mandated
that the Court of Federal Claims, the Court of International Trade, and the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit establish similar procedures for the filing of complaints
“with respect to the conduct of any judge of such court and for the investigation and
resolution of such complaints.” 28 U.S.C. § 363 (2000).
284
28 U.S.C. § 352(a) (2000).
285
Id. §§ 352, 353.
286
28 U.S.C. § 354 (2000). Notably, § 354 details various actions which may be
taken by the Judicial Council, but imposes limits on the Judicial Council regarding
removals. Id. § 354(a)(3). The Judicial Council does not have the power to remove an
Article III judge from the bench. Id. § 354 (a)(3)(A).
287
Id. § 357.
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Judicial Conference of the United States if the case requires
further disciplinary action.288
Thus, a disciplinary complaint against a federal judge
may be subject to several layers of appeal. Congress’s clearly
organized procedures relating to the investigation of
misbehaving federal judges indicates its concern about judicial
ethics. In contrast to the ambiguity experienced by
complainants filing behavioral allegations against immigration
judges, complaints and investigative procedures for the federal
judiciary are well developed and opinions of Judicial Councils
are publicly available.289 Accordingly, the disciplinary process
for federal judges serves as a useful model to reform EOIR’s
complaint procedures.
2. Analogy: Disciplinary Process for California
State Judges
Article III judges enjoy life tenure, which places them in
a different situation than both state judges and immigration
judges. Thus, while certain components of the disciplinary
procedure for Article III judges should be applied to
immigration judges, the disposition of complaints against
judges should be handled differently. California’s judicial
disciplinary process adjudicates complaints against state
judges in a manner placing a premium on accountability, a
method which should be adopted by EOIR.
The State of California Commission on Judicial
Performance (“CJP”) receives complaints from “anyone”—
including litigants, lawyers, members of the public, other
judges, and court staff.290 Unlike the complaint process at
EOIR, every person who files a complaint with the CJP will
receive notification in writing of the CJP’s action on a
complaint.291 After the CJP investigates a complaint, “the
Commission has several options.”292 If the investigation
revealed no misconduct on the part of the judge, the CJP will
288

Id. § 354(b)(1). If the Judicial Council determines that a judge’s action may
constitute grounds for impeachment, or is not amenable to resolution by the Judicial
Council, the Council must refer the case to the Judicial Conference. Id. § 354(b)(2).
289
See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, 62 F.2d 320 (9th Cir. 1995).
290
State of Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, How to File a Complaint,
http://cjp.ca.gov/filingacomp.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
291
Id.
292
State of Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, Action the Commission Can
Take, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/2001cases.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
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close the case and notify the complainant of the dismissal.293 If
minor misconduct was discovered on the part of the judge, the
CJP could “issue an ‘advisory letter’ to the judge,” advising
caution or expressing disapproval of the conduct at issue.294 For
more serious misconduct, the CJP may issue a “private
admonishment,” which is designed “to bring problems to a
judge’s attention at an early stage in the hope that the
misconduct will not be repeated or escalate.”295 These
confidential proceedings are not released to the public.
For very serious misconduct, the California judicial
disciplinary process uses public disclosure to hold judges
accountable. Cases involving persistent and pervasive
misconduct may result in a “public admonishment,” or the
more serious “public censure.”296 Public admonishments and
public censures are both notifications describing the conduct
and the CJP’s findings, which are sent to the judge and also
made available to the press and the public.297 This system
emphasizes public accountability: since state judges are public
officials, the public has the right to know when judges are
misbehaving.
A similar public accountability system should be
instituted for immigration judges accused of serious
misconduct. Public admonishment or public censure for
immigration judges engaging in egregious unethical behavior
would add an effective layer of accountability to EOIR’s judicial
structure, particularly in light of renewed public attention on
judicial misconduct.
E.

Proposed Disciplinary Structure for Immigration Judges

The creation of an Ethics Review Board adopting
elements of the disciplinary process for federal judges and
California state judges would provide much-needed clarity to
EOIR’s disciplinary process. First, the standards of ethical
conduct for immigration judges should be simplified:
complaints should be based upon violations of revised and more
specific Codes of Conduct. Persons wishing to allege violations
293

Id.
Id.
295
Id.
296
Id.
297
Id. Judges have the right to ask the California Supreme Court “to review
an admonishment, censure, removal or involuntary retirement determination.” Id.
294
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of the Codes may file a complaint with the EOIR Ethics Review
Board. To remedy the concerns raised by allowing one person
with supervisory authority to review and dismiss a complaint,
the ERB should consist of a five to nine member panel. In this
way, enforcement of the Codes of Conduct would be the
responsibility of a third-party panel. A panel review with a
detached group of individuals is a more appropriate method of
handling complaints, since a “panel is less likely to make a
mistake than is a single [individual].”298
The members of the ERB would conduct an
investigation similar to the inquiry undertaken by a federal
chief judge in response to a complaint. Based on this inquiry,
following California’s model, the ERB could have several
options for disposition of the complaint. The ERB could (1)
dismiss the complaint, (2) resolve the complaint informally
through mediation or another form of alternative dispute
resolution, (3) take action on a complaint through an advisory
letter or private admonishment, or (4) reprimand an IJ for
serious misconduct through public admonishment or public
censure.
Regardless of the ERB’s determination, two factors
must be present. First, if either party disagrees with the ERB’s
resolution, appeal must be available. Like the petition for
review of a federal chief judge’s decision to the Judicial Council,
the ERB’s resolution should be appealable to the EOIR Office of
General Counsel. This process deliberately skips the current
evaluators of complaints against immigration judges (the ACIJ,
OCIJ, and EOIR Director), since their failure to adequately
enforce proper behavior on the immigration bench has
contributed to the current ethical crisis. The EOIR Office of
General Counsel may refer a complaint alleging misconduct to
the DOJ Office of Professional Responsibility or the Office of
the Inspector General. Alternatively, either party seeking a
final review should file an appeal to the Office of the Attorney
General, who holds ultimate responsibility for the actions of
immigration judges.
Second, to alleviate the uncertainty of the current
process for complainants, the ERB must create a written record
of its investigation and decision-making process. This detailed
record need not be made available to the public, but should be

298

Cruz, supra note 11, at 507.
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accessible to the complaining party and the judge whose
conduct is in question.
If the ERB chooses to reprimand an IJ through public
admonishment or public censure, much like California’s
disciplinary system, the names of these judges should be
available on the EOIR website. In addition, a statistical report
regarding complaints of unethical misconduct against
immigration judges must be made public for accountability
purposes. This public report could take the form of California’s
CJP statistics, which compile the numbers of new complaints
considered by the CJP, investigations commenced, and
ultimate dispositions of cases.299 California also compiles
summaries of actions taken against state judges describing the
details of misconduct resulting in discipline.300 These annual
summaries are useful for judges concerned about avoiding
discipline for similar behavior. Privacy concerns could prevent
the full, detailed investigation record of the ERB from being
publicly released. At a minimum, however, public reports
should include information regarding how many complaints of
ethical misconduct are filed each year against immigration
judges, examples of the types of complaints filed, and how such
complaints are resolved.
F.

Benefits of Ethics Review Board

The creation of an Ethics Review Board would provide
several benefits to the DOJ. Like the complaint procedure for
federal judges under the Judicial Councils Act, this system
offers several methods of appeal and multiple reviewers for
each complaint filed, ensuring that complaints are handled
properly. Also, IJs will be aware that unethical behavior,
particularly biased behavior against litigants, will have public
consequences. The mere possibility of public accountability
could be enough to deter some judges from acting in an
unethical manner, for the threat of public embarrassment will
likely encourage most IJs to act more carefully on the bench.
As judicial performance improves, litigants may be less
inclined to file appeals to the BIA and circuit courts. In this
299
See CJP, 10-Year Summary of Commission Activity, http://cjp.ca.gov/
TenYearStats.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
300
See CJP, 2006 Private Discipline Summaries, http://www.cjp.ca.gov/
2001privdisc.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008); CJP, 2006 Public Discipline,
http://www.cjp.ca.gov/commcases.htm (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
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way, a more ethical judiciary at the IJ level could help alleviate
the “surge” in the circuit courts.301
Perhaps more importantly, those IJs who continue to
act improperly will actually be held accountable for their
behavior. Rather than relying on the circuit courts, reporters,
or legal scholars to identify “bad apples” among IJs and BIA
members, EOIR and the DOJ could recognize, discipline, and
remove biased or incompetent judges before their behavior
impacts large numbers of applicants. As a result, the ethical
integrity of immigration judges and BIA members would
noticeably improve.
In addition, this improved layer of accountability serves
a separate purpose for the Justice Department: sorely needed
public relations benefits. Creating an Ethics Review Board, in
addition to enhanced ethics training for judges, would
demonstrate the DOJ’s renewed commitment to ensuring
ethical conduct. Moreover, if litigants entering immigration
courts know they will be guaranteed a “professional manner”302
and “impartial treatment,”303 and also know that a systematic
method for complaints is available if they encounter otherwise,
a more positive public perception of EOIR and its judges could
be restored.
Creation of an Ethics Review Board would also be cost
effective. There is no need to hire large numbers to staff the
ERB; indeed, a five- to nine-member panel would be sufficient
as a start. Lawyers from the DOJ Office of Government Ethics,
who are trained in ethics standards and advise attorneys
throughout the department on ethical issues, would be well
suited for the position. Alternatively, the ERB could consist of a
variety of members—including practitioners or advocates from
both sides of the immigration debate—to assure a balanced
consideration of complaints. Also, members would serve one to
two-year terms on the ERB, to minimize the time commitment
required for each member. The low-cost creation of a small
board, guaranteeing accountability for judges’ violations of
EOIR’s own Codes of Conduct, will go a long way toward
restoring the fairness and integrity of the immigration system.
301
Seipp & Feal, supra note 18, at 2012 (circuit courts are taking time to
“graphically expose the unfortunate number of glaringly defective decisions” rendered
by IJs). With more ethical behavior on the bench, the number of “glaringly defective”
decisions will hopefully decrease, freeing the circuit courts to consider more
substantive legal issues.
302
EOIR Codes, supra note 217, Canon X.
303
Id. Canon VI.
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CONCLUSION

The crisis in the immigration courts warrants
examination from the perspective of judicial ethics. Increasing
reports of biased or incompetent conduct on the immigration
bench raise particular concerns about the ability of the
immigration court system to properly adjudicate cases. But
these pervasive ethical problems also present an unparalleled
opportunity for reform.
The Attorney General’s pending proposals to redress
improper conduct on the part of immigration judges indicates
recognition of the problem and government willingness to
improve. However, some of the pending reforms, such as the
EOIR Codes of Conduct, suffer from significant flaws
undermining their power to ensure unbiased and competent
behavior on the immigration bench.
Numerous effective reform proposals have been
articulated in recent months, and this author joins legal
scholars, appellate judges, and practitioners in supporting
structural changes.304 To reframe the ongoing discussion from
an ethical perspective, this article proposes three practical
reforms designed to actively promote ethical conduct for
immigration judges. For a start, the EOIR Codes of Conduct
could be used as a springboard to address challenges facing
immigration judges, such as excessive caseloads. Genuine
improvement will also require the investment of more time and
money for training courses on judicial ethics. Additionally, a
panel of reviewers in the form of an Ethics Review Board
will develop accountability and consequences for judicial
misconduct. The ERB will take responsibility for monitoring
complaints away from a single individual, and place the burden
more fairly on a multi-member panel. Such changes would
benefit not only individuals litigating in immigration court, but
would also signify the Department of Justice’s renewed
commitment to ethical conduct in the courtroom. It is hoped
that expanded recognition of the ethical repercussions of this
crisis will soon translate into meaningful change—for litigants
like Mr. Tun and Mr. Elias, and for immigration judges seeking
to do their jobs well.

304

See sources cited in supra note 11; see also supra Part V.

